






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John Carter Broton.





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A  
L E T T E R  
T O A  
G R E A T M-----R,  
O N T H E  
Prospect of a P E A C E ;

Wherein the DEMOLITION of the  
Fortifications of LOUISBOURG  
Is shewn to be absurd;

The Importance of Canada fully refuted ;

The proper Barrier pointed out in NORTH  
AMERICA ; and the Reasonableness and Necessity of  
retaining the FRENCH SUGAR ISLANDS.

Containing REMARKS on some preceding Pamphlets that have  
treated of the Subject, and a succinct View of the whole  
Terms that ought to be insisted on from FRANCE at a  
future Negotiation.

By an unprejudiced OBSERVER.

*Omnino qui reipublicæ præfuit sunt, duo Platonis præcepta teneant; unum,  
ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quicquid agunt, ad eam referant, obliti  
commodorum; suorum alterum, ut totum corpus reipublicæ current, ne, dum  
partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deferant. Ut enim tutela, sic ratio reipub-  
licæ ad utilitatem eorum, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissæ  
est, gerenda est.*

CICERO.

*Hic, tu Africane, ostendas oportebit patriæ lumen animi, ingenii, consiliiq;  
tui. --- Te senatus, te omnes boni, te socii, te Latini intuebuntur; tu eris  
unus in quo nitatur civitatis salus.*

Idem.

L O N D O N :

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
JOHN CARTER BROWN





A  
L E T T E R  
T O A  
G R E A T M—R.

S I R,

 H E subject of a future peace, and of my present letter, which of late so much engrossed the public attention, has lain so long dormant, that I am apprehensive a revival of it, will not meet with an equal indulgence. The minds of men, in general, are too open to the impressions of prejudice, and too ready to propagate them, when conceived; unless immediately eradicated upon the first symptoms, the disease becomes contagious, all prescriptions useless, and, at length, we have no longer a right to speak or think. Thus reason, the brightest ornament of the human mind, is suborned, and overborne by the torrent of popularity, and forced to submit to the giddy plaudite of a multitude.

B

Equally



Equally free to excuse as condemn, I will acknowledge there is some foundation to plead the privilege of a too favourable opinion ; the want of opposition, or rather total silence that hath ensued since the publication of a certain pamphlet \*, hath too long given the advocates of that system occasion for triumph, and cause for the most wary of my countrymen to be, in a manner, reconciled to their insinuating, but delusive arguments ; not only delusive as being erroneous or superficial in matter, but by misrepresenting circumstances, and evading the chief points in dispute with all the arts of sophistry and subterfuge. These arts, Sir, have been carried to such height, that I cannot say, even with respect to the author himself, “ That I have lived to see subjects of the  
 “ greatest importance to this nation, publickly discussed  
 “ without party views or party heat, with decency and  
 “ politeness, and with no other warmth than what a  
 “ zeal for the honour and happiness of our King and  
 “ country “ might” inspire.” †

If we differ thus much in matters of sentiments, no wonder we should, in matters of fact ; and that we do this, and pretty largely too, will appear in the course of these sheets.

I do not “ affect to discover self-interested views at  
 “ the bottom of the fairest, and most generous conduct ;”  
 I do not affect to be so inquisitive into “ human nature,”  
 Reason and Justice are my advocates in our present difference.

When I saw men publish their opinions, without previously consulting their judgment ; when I heard them in a dictatorial tone exclaim, that we should have “ a

\* The interest of Great Britain considered with regard to her colonies, and the acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe. † Id. p. 1.



“ treacherous and delusive peace \*,” if not made conformable to their own ideas (though ever so absurd) could I think it other than an offence to candour and fair reasoning, especially when there was so much room to doubt their systems by their many contradictions and inconsistencies? we were told that the French “ were tired “ of Canada,” and that it “ was not worth their asking :” and that, “ the inclemency of the climate,” and “ the difficult access to it,” were not the only causes of this dislike, but still farther, “ a trade scarcely defraying the expence of the colony;” and yet, Sir, this very colony was recommended to us by the same author, as singly to be preferred before all other objects, and every other conquest that we had, or might obtain from the enemy, was to be sacrificed at a future negociation. I say, Sir, such seeming inconsistencies must excite doubts of the truth of those facts, or the propriety of the author’s hypothesis, and a desire among unprejudiced men, and those who know what they read, to have the subject farther discussed, and made consonant, at least, to common comprehension. Though inferior in dignity and fortune, my opinion, in that or any other matter, might be equally strong and important, my love to my country equally prevalent and disinterested. If I had doubts, I had a right to divulge those doubts, I had a right to expect them to be cleared up, and to suspend my judgment till it was effectually complied with. To see, therefore, every avenue to that desirable end, forcibly stopped up by such rude and hasty declarations in favour of a particular object, as that without it we

\* Letter to two great men, p. 29.

† Ibid. p. 30, 31.



should “ have a treacheous and delucifive peace, we” should “ soon find we had done nothing \*,” and the like must occasion doubts, not only of the candour, but probity of the author.

When I heard another set of men, under the present circumstances of the nation, and the war, urge a restitution with so much warmth, and without the least precedent or authority to enforce such an innovated doctrine, could I impute it to an over zeal, to an ardour for the honour of our King and country? Moderation, Sir, is truly commendable; but it may serve as a cloak to base and iniquitous purposes; it may be professed and practised too, not only to check “ the madness of the “ people,” but to “ make a virtuous and able ministry “ act against themselves,” their judgment, and the most important interests of their country. If the author of the Letter to two Great Men was reprehensible for a repetition of French perfidy, and a desire to see the stipulations of a former treaty executed previous to a future peace, and was therefore to be censured as tending to increase and inflame an improper disposition among the people; how much more so must his accuser, who pretends to be so cautious of fomenting popular clamours, and yet affords much greater cause for them, by unjust obliquy and reproach, could telling the people, their “ arrogance” would “ destroy” the good intentions of “ a virtuous and able ministry,” and the “ effects” of “ their victories and successes;” could telling them, they “ had no share in acquiring” those “ successes,” be the means of preventing or abating this insolent mood he complains of? Such language seemed so far from being the

\* Letter to two great men, p. 31.



result of decency and moderation, that I could not but consider it as the venom of a former insulting faction : it was certainly a sure method to sow the seeds of general discontent. The populace of this kingdom are born and educated in high notions of their liberties, and, consequently, look with a watchful eye on the prerogatives of government ; so that every attempt to diminish the one, or extend the other, would quickly raise seditions, telling them of their pretended “ arrogance ” was, in effect, giving them to understand, that they made themselves free in a matter, which, though the issue of it so very nearly concerned them, they were not to be consulted in, telling them they had no share in acquiring the “ victories and successes ” obtained over the enemy was saying that they had not the least right to trouble themselves about the measures or event of the war, for that they neither fought the battles, nor bore any share in the expences, assertions which are in every respect false and unjust. Is it not they that cultivate our lands, reap our harvests, fabricate those manufactures which are diffused over the whole world, and, in fact, bring plenty and riches into the kingdom ? Is it not they that furnish men for our victorious armies and fleets ? Is it not they that receive the greatest injury from the heaviness of the taxes, and that bear all the miseries of the war by the obstruction to trade in general ? Is it not the middling people, and those in subordinate stations, or to use the gentleman’s own meaning, Is it not the mob who do and suffer all this ? Wherefore then should they be treated so contemptuously ? The mite of the needy husbandman is as worthy as the largest donation of a peer ; he subscribes in proportion to his ability ; nay more : by  
the



the encrease of taxes, the livelihood of the former is visibly affected: he must retrench his most essential demands for necessaries, while the latter only contracts his superfluities. By the continuance of the war, the former is subject to all the insolence of office; and the scarcity of servants, a natural consequence of such war, of course much enhances the price of labour, while his crops are still subject to the same intemperature of weather; the markets to be overstocked from the want of consumption; and his commodities, being perishable, must be disposed of at all events, which, at the best of times, will bear very little, if any, advancement in price. Could it then be just or reasonable to brand these people with such odious epithets? It was done without the least cause; they do not raise a clamour against the measures of the government, or the continuance of the war, rather the contrary; they recommend a vigorous prosecution of it; but, then, they hope when a peace is made, it will be such, as will relieve them from a repetition so burthensome. If they are over-warm in their expressions against the French, let it be imputed to a little ebullition of hereditary enmity. The infraction of former treaties by France, her natural ambition and treachery authorize the most severe reflections; but yet we do not hear the terms of tyrants, they do not carry so much the appearance of private pique to the enemy, as a regard to their own security, and that of all Europe.

I reflected the more, Sir, on this improper disposition among our writers, and pretended admonishers, because it was at the time of a supposed approaching congress; a time when unanimity ought to have been most prevalent



lent throughout the kingdom, and when every head, and every hand ought to have been employed for the general good, with deliberation, and void of the least partiality. Instead of this, systems were introduced, in themselves absurd, and rendered more so by the manner of introducing them, and such as tended only “to embarrass the negotiation, and render it a work of infinite difficulty.

It is not “the beauty of expression \*,” nor an harmony of sounds that can bias my judgment; they may tickle my ear, but cannot seduce my heart; I do not pay such a blind deference to the external ornaments; I read them as such; I read them as introduced merely *Argumenti gratiâ*, often the effects of a bad cause, and often intended to cheat people of their proper understanding. But as my countrymen, in general are characterized for their great knowledge and wisdom, I hope they have not considered sophistry as fair reasoning, and suffered prejudice to gain too great an ascendant over them at the present conjuncture. Impartial men suspend their judgment till the matter has been properly canvassed, if they find the cause of their prejudices removed, they will then retract their too favourable opinion; reason will have its due influence, and will direct their approbation; but, whatever system they incline to, let me remind them to recollect the consequence, let them likewise recollect, that it is a unanimous perseverance in their own interest, which is the only means to check future factions; and that it will ever sustain the efforts of a wise and virtuous administration.

And you, Sir, I flatter myself, will pardon this familiar and intrusive address; the occasion, and your own

\* Int. &c. p. 1.



public declarations prompted me, the nature of your office in a manner required it. You have been particularly distinguished by a noble emulation for the good of your country, I therefore persuade myself you will not condemn the weakest effort built on that foundation, and aiming principally at the same glorious end. If I have not done this before, inclination was not wanting to urge me; I heard a system adopted which, I was convinced would prove detrimental to my country; I heard of the demolition of the fortifications of Louisbourg, a consequence of that system, with the utmost regret; I heard it with the most pungent concern; but then some affairs intervened, which required my absence, at a time when I had just formed an intention of entering the lists as a writer: I therefore hoped some one more disengaged, would have undertook that office, an office, which seemed to me altogether so praise worthy, and even incumbent on every Briton, who regarded his country, and thought as I did. Whence then proceeds my mistake? are the people so prepossessed, or tired of any further discussion? is it from a diffidence of sufficient matter to promote a more nice disquisition? or, is it from the effects of sloth? I am apprehensive, these have all too much co-operated in their turns, to render a design of this nature, if ever such a one was conceived abortive; all future expectations of it seem to have entirely vanished; nor should I now trouble you with this letter, but that the love of my country, regard for you, and particularly the pressing exigencies of the times, conspire and urge me to the task. The rage of war which seems rather to encrease than abate, notwithstanding the continued bad success of our enemies, induces me to take up the pen, and makes me hope that council may be  
neither



neither too late nor ineffectual ; it must come more acceptable, Sir, as being at a time when the subject of peace is revived, and, if the war is continued, where the prosecution of it will be the most serviceable.

Not bred in the school of flattery and adulation, my letter may, perhaps, appear in a homely garb, and unadorned with the flowers of eloquence and fulsome panegyrick ; but let not that act against me, nor my cause ; I address you as a plain Englishman, not as an orator ; I do not presume to correspond with you in court phrases, but in the rude language of a Civilian. Nor would I intrude myself upon you, Sir, with the impertinence of privacy, I commit my letter to the press, that it may introduce itself to you, if not by the voice of a multitude, at least from the plausibility of a title. And I am the rather inclined to a publication, as I should be much pleased, if any gentleman differs from me in opinion, to see the subject farther discussed. Not blind, though zealous, nor bigotted, though tenacious, I stand open to conviction ; if my opinions are erroneous, let them be refuted with decency, and my heart shall thank the man that better instructs me ; but, till that is done, excuse me, Sir, for a little petulance and obstinacy. With regard to myself, I can assure you, Sir, and with truth, that I have not the least connection or interest in giving a preference to any particular object, my pen indites what my heart dictates ; the subject seems to me of national importance, and, if such, is worthy of your regard, and ought to meet with your indulgence and utmost encouragement.

You may possibly, Sir, admire at my addressing you singly and alone ; but when I consider your station, as mediator between Majesty and the subject, and your de-



clarations ever to encourage the national honour and welfare ; the one induces me to think, that the manner of conducting a future negotiation, and the terms of the peace, principally depend on you ; and the other likewise induces me to hope for the good effects of your promised encouragement.

You have, Sir, the endeavours of a man, who thinks much of his country, and not lightly of you, and one who is a friend to mankind. If in the course of the following sheets, I should contribute to the cause of either, I should rest satisfied ; but if I should expose the absurdities of other systems, and be the means of reconciling the proper objects of a future peace to the national honour and emolument ; if I should be partly the humble instrument of procuring a lasting peace, my happiness would be compleat ; my time could not be better spent, than when it proved conducive to the tranquillity of mankind, and the welfare of my country. If I should not succeed, I should still have that pleasing satisfaction, which every honest man feels from the uprightness of his intentions.

I will likewise acknowledge, Sir, I have received no small additional temptation to my present plan, from the war now subsisting between us, and the Indians on the back of our settlements in South Carolina ; it hath not a little confirmed me in an opinion that Canada would not answer the mighty things, that were urged in favour of its retention, and in preference to all other objects. Upon the first advice of this rupture, I foresaw, in some measure, the many difficulties we should incur ; it has always been a maxim with me, to conciliate the affections of the Indians, and rather be at variance with the French in America, than with these people,



people, whom I thought to be our truest and most natural friends, and whom it was our interest to be upon good terms with ; and, at present, I cannot but consider the differences between us, in the light of a prophetic warning, not only to provide against the like hereafter, but also to direct our judgment in an ensuing negotiation.

What the event of this war will prove, I will not pretend to determine ; but thus far I will say, that the destruction of the towns of those Indians, has only served to reduce them to despair, and make them more implacable enemies. Revenge will stimulate them to acts of horror, which we may the rather expect from them, as being a people that naturally “ delight in war, and “ take pride in murder \*”, and who measure their notions of honour in proportion to their inhumanities. The French have felt the effects of their savage principles, and so have we, and pretty severely too, which ought to induce us to be more circumspect in our conduct for the future. I do not mean to insinuate the least reflection on those who promoted this war, or have been instrumental in carrying it on ; we had better have them open enemies, than treacherous and subtle friends. But since we have made the breach so much the wider, let us not leave affairs in a worse situation than they were before that breach ; it would be destroying the cause of the war, and only tend to give them a meaner idea of our national courage and ability. The way to bring them to our terms is not by negotiation, but by force and arms ; if we exert our strength, they will be much more ready to embrace our interest, and continue firm in our alliance ; but then let not this ex-

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 5.



ertion be directed as against a few tribes of vagabond savages, but as against a populous and warlike nation, spurred on by the French, who connive at their rebellion, and who probably do, and will farther assist them with ammunition, and their own forces; an assertion of the truth of which I am fully persuaded, notwithstanding their commander at Albama, offered to take our traders into the fort, and protect them from the savages; a circumstance which, I cannot but think, was owing to artifice, and to a fear lest we should divert our victorious arms to that quarter. And I dread the more the uncertain issue of this war, by the repeated accounts we have received from our colonies, of several of the French Indians and Canadians being about to retire to these parts, nay, that several of them were actually gone. The French had considerable settlements at Detroit and Missilimakinac, and several straggling ones about the south and west coasts of the lakes Erie, and Michigan, the inhabitants of which, upon hearing of the loss of Canada, have most of them, very probably, retired to their countrymen in Louisiana, either with a view of settling, or joining the rebel Indians for the sake of plunder, which is, indeed, most likely, as the settlers about the lakes were chiefly civilized Indians and disbanded soldiers. I repeat again, Sir, if the French from Canada have retired to these parts, or if the war should become extended among the Indians, it may prove of the most fatal consequences. It is evident there is not the least dependence to be placed on the Creeks, they have murdered some of our traders, have neglected, if not actually refused, to make satisfaction for the insult, or to deliver up the murderers; nay, the assembly of the province has been so conscious of the ticklish situation of

affairs



affairs with them, that they have been afraid to insist on the usual satisfaction. Tho' matters have not hitherto been carried to any certainty of a defection of the other tribes of Indians settled about these parts from our interest; yet the retreat of the army under Col. Montgomery, hath been productive of further insolence from them, and we have tamely submitted to it, for fear of giving them the least offence. The Chactaws are entirely in the French interest, and have been only restrained from attacking our settlements for fear of these Creeks, who are between them and the province of Georgia. If therefore the Creeks should declare against us, the Chactaws would likewise; and both of them together can send upwards of twelve thousand warriors to the field. The removal of the army under Colonel Montgomery at such a critical juncture is, to all appearance, very absurd. The season of the year was too far advanced for them to be of any service in the reduction of Canada, they could be therefore ordered to New York, merely to go into quarters, and that at a time when there was the greatest reason for them to stay on the frontiers of Carolina. But as it is generally believed the regiment of Royal Welch volunteers, and the independent companies gone some time since from England, are to supply their place, I hope they will get there time enough to check the enemy's progress, and their future machinations. Matters at present look but badly; fort Loudoun is fallen, and though the Indians have raised the blockade of fort Prince George, they may return with fresh vigour, as they did to fort Loudoun, and have the same success; in which case they will have full scope to exercise their fury: the scalping blood-hounds would be let loose, and destroy and depopulate our most fertile

set-



settlements ; and, in a colony, where there are three or four blacks to one white, the consequences are truly horrible. The inhabitants have already thought of arming themselves agreeable to the martial mandate.

The two Carolinas and Georgia, Sir, are likely to prove very valuable colonies to their mother country, are objects worthy her very tender regard, and entitled to her most vigorous protection ; and as the war was, most certainly, commenced in the cause of the colonies, it is reasonable to expect, that regard should be had to serve those who stand in the greatest need of it. That Canada will not answer the purpose, I am convinced of ; it will employ no small part of my present letter. But before I proceed on the merits, give me leave, Sir, to consider what has been already said upon the subject.

The chief objections made by the remarker against retaining, Canada may be reduced to four, viz.

1st, That Canada, with regard to the West India trade, would be a very unnecessary acquisition for us,  
 “ who have such immense tracts, so much more conveniently situated for that trade, and who could easily  
 “ supply five times the consumption of ours, the French,  
 “ and all the West India islands put together, and that  
 “ too, at a much easier rate, than they can possibly  
 “ have” them “ at from Canada.”

2dly, That “ Canada, situated in a cold climate,” produced “ no commodity, except furs and skins, which  
 “ she” could “ exchange for the commodities of Europe ; and, consequently she could have little returns  
 “ to make the English merchant.”

3dly, That, this “ trade,” when “ carried on with  
 “ France, fell short, in its most flourishing state, of  
 “ 140,000 l. a year.” And,

4thly,



4thly, That "Canada, in our hands, would not, probably, yield half what it did to France."

These, Sir, I think, were objections of a very nice concern to England, such as might have staggered the faith of those who entertained any rational notions of retaining Canada; and such, as having been publicly asserted, ought, undoubtedly, to have been as publicly refuted before such a notion was indulged.

That this has not been done, I need not forbear to insist upon, I can safely challenge any man to show me the contrary. Even the author of the pretended Reply \*, who undertook to convince us of the superior interest we should have in Canada, above every other conquest has passed over in silence every material objection made against it; and instead thereof, from some words casually dropt by the remarker, took occasion to enter into an elaborate, and indeed very unnecessary defence of our American colonies; he tells us how absurd the insinuations are of their future independence; informs us of the nature of population in new countries, and strongly urges the necessity of extending our settlements, which, we are given to understand, is the only means to prevent such independence. These are the author's chief topics, and from thence is inferred, that we must keep Canada at all events. I thought, when I first read the pamphlet, and still do think, that it is rather a defence of our northern colonies in general, than Canada. There were no doubts started of the value of our North American colonies, the objections of the remarker did not rest on that point; if they had, it was a doctrine every way unpopular, nor would any

\* Interest of Great Britain, &c.



one ever entertain a notion of giving up any part of them to the French, whose great power had already made it necessary to undertake a heavy war to check them. But I cannot help observing, that such trivial expressions of the remarker, as, "the war was commenced in the cause of the colonies," and "we know what trifling returns we have from some of our own very flourishing colonies in America," seem to have founded the production of a pamphlet of near sixty columns; and that the sole drift of defending our North American colonies, seems to be to introduce an artful misapplication of things in favour of Canada, as might be proved from many instances.

But waving all notice of this kind, give me leave, Sir, to enter into the cause of my present address; there is enough to be said upon that head, without diving into idle quibbling; but it may be necessary to consider the nature of Canada under the French government, in order to deduce some reasonable suggestions of its future situation under England. For this, Sir, I persuade myself, I shall stand excused, tho' it should carry me to encroach on your time, more than I could have wished, as it is the only way to come at the truth, and bring matters to their proper bearings.

France, Sir, at the first forming a colony in Canada, had many difficulties to encounter, which proved almost insuperable. Common sense dictated to the most simple capacity, that a country so far to the north, must be subject to many inconveniences from the inclemency of the climate; the French King, therefore endeavoured, in a manner, to force a settlement by many immunities and indulgencies granted to all who would become settlers; but notwithstanding the many attractions made  
use



use of on this occasion, very few volunteers entered into the service.

The flews were ransacked for females; and those wretches, whose lives had been already forfeited to the gallies, for their atrocious crimes, were forced to accompany them. Such was the connubial association, formed to people this all-excelling Canada, a country which was looked upon, even by these objects of misery, with an excess of horror and contempt. If these natural difficulties of the country had not subsisted, would France have proceeded to these extremities to people it? Would she have given such large indulgencies to settlers; at least, would she have continued them, as she has done, if they were not absolutely necessary to detain the inhabitants in their settlement? These difficulties of the country will appear to greater excess, if we only consider the extent of the indulgencies.

Every settler had not only his passage free from France, but was allotted a settlement \*, and supplied with the necessary utensils to cultivate such settlement; with this only reservation, that he should repay one-third of the produce of his lands, till the sum, advanced, to enable him to carry on his settlement, was fully paid. The exports to and from France, were exempted from any impost or duty, neither were they liable to any, on being imported in Canada, except Brazil tobacco, which paid about twenty shillings sterling, per hundred weight, and was intended merely to promote the growth of that commodity in their own colonies. The whole charge

\* According to the Baron Lahontan, " The poorest of them have four arpents of ground in front, and thirty or forty in depth. An arpent is a spot of ground containing 100 perches square, each of which is eighteen feet long. See Lahontan's Voyage to North America, Letter 2.



of paying the civil and military officers, and repairing and maintaining the fortifications was likewise vested in the crown. But notwithstanding these advantages, the Canadians could never surmount the natural difficulties of their station, occasioned by the intemperature of the climate, and barrenness of the soil. All the money that ever centered in Canada came from France by virtue of the royal establishment (including the civil officers, and the military gentry sent by the French King to defend the colony;) and this no sooner came to their hands, than it was drawn off again by the over-balance of their trade with Old France, for Canada having no other commodity wherewith to supply a European market, but furs, their demands for European commodities, not only to support their own wants, but likewise the Indian trade, greatly exceeded their abilities to return in that article; they were therefore of necessity obliged to pay the deficiency in money, or bills of exchange. As a farther encouragement to the settlers, and to procure a mutual commerce, the royal establishment was made accountable for the bills of exchange; for specie being very little, if at all, used in Canada, paper credit would not have been accepted as cash, or even negotiable, without some such security for the due payment, as had been frequently experienced, to the no small detriment of the inhabitants. Can we then call Canada an opulent, or even a thriving colony, and deserving of our most trifling consideration, when it could not depend upon its own foundation for a support; when it could not, at its highest pitch of grandeur, bear its own necessary expences, or keep a part of the money sent thither to pay its own officers? nay, it is an undoubted truth, that the running cash of Canada (which the inhabitants



habitants have been frequently obliged to circulate, notwithstanding the loss to themselves from its inferior value \*) has been of late years reduced so low as within a few thousand livres, the greatest part of which of course centered in the capital †. Was not the manner, living, and employment among the Canadians in general, ever such as denoted the extreme indigence and poverty? Was the principal inhabitants ever to be put on a level with the ordinary people of our own colonies ‡? Did they not

D 2

rather

\* " If the merchant sells his skins to any private man in the country for ready money, he is paid in the current money, which is of less value than the bills of exchange, that the director of the office of the farmers general draws upon Rochel or Paris; for there they are paid in French livres, which are twenty sols, whereas a Canada livre is but fifteen sols." Lahontan, page 54.

† Father Charlevoix who was in Canada in 1721, speaking of the scarcity of coin, says, " in a word you will be surprized, when I tell you, that in 1706, the trade of the most ancient of all our colonies was carried on in a bottom, or capital, of no more than 650,030 livres, and things have been pretty much in the same situation. Now this sum divided among thirty thousand inhabitants, is neither capable of enriching them, nor of enabling them to purchase the commodities of France." *For this reason most part of them go stark naked, especially those that live in remote habitations.* " They have not even the advantage of selling the surplus of their commodities to the inhabitants of cities, those being obliged, in order to subsist, to have lands in the country, and to cultivate them themselves for their own account," so that high or low were farmers or hunters. A pretty picture this of Canadian affluence, and well worth our envy! Charlevoix, Letter 4, Vol. I. p. 149.

‡ Charlevoix, in the parallel he draws between the English and French colonies, has the following paragraph. " In New England, and the other provinces of the continent of America, subject to the British empire, there prevails an opulence which they are utterly at a loss how to use; and in New France, a poverty hid by an air of being in easy circumstances, which seems not at all studied. Trade and the cultivation of their plantations strengthen the first, whereas the second is supported by the industry of its inhabitants, and the taste of the nation diffuses over it

" some-



rather lead the lives of slaves both in labour and diet? The inland communication between the several districts in Canada was during summer (if it can be so called) chiefly carried on by boats and canoes; what therefore could be more miserable than seeing some paddling up and down the lakes and rivers like so many savages, for the lakes and rivers, being in many parts very shallow, and in others subject to large and dangerous cataracts were rendered unfit for any other method of navigation? What could likewise be more miserable than seeing others delving in the earth with pickaxes to break the hardened surface? Their occupations in winter were still worse, some were employed like so many Laplanders in guiding sledges drawn by horses, or other animals over vast tracts of snow and ice, the only method they had to keep up a correspondence with their neighbours: some (to use an English phrase) lived like so many Orsons, or wild men of the wood upon their dear bought spoil from among the wild beasts; and others made shift to subsist upon the fish they got by breaking through the ice; an employment often impracticable, and at other times equally laborious and dangerous as the others. There are those who urge that the populousness of Canada contradict these assertions; our public papers which, some time ago, so much vilified this French colony, seem to have adopted this doctrine; they now do all they can to aggrandize it; they give pompous lists of the number

“ something infinitely pleasing. The English planter amasses wealth, and  
 “ never makes any superfluous expence; the French inhabitant again en-  
 “ joys what he has acquired, and often makes a parade of what he is not  
 “ possessed of. That labours for his posterity; this again leaves his off-  
 “ spring in the same necessities he was in himself at his first setting out,  
 “ and to extricate themselves as they can. Id. p. 113. Letter 3.

and



and extent of the cities, towns, villages, and villas, which they eagerly publish with all the assurance of authenticity, and presume, as a certainty, of its importance. But admit their accounts even to be genuine, are we from thence to infer any natural perfection of the country, or to blindly imagine it will be so infinitely advantageous to us, from this abundant population? France, Sir, being a kingdom so populous and extensive in itself, and where agriculture is neglected, and the country, for want of it, doth not grow enough to support its own inhabitants, need we wonder that where a settlement is formed, and such large indulgencies granted, it should attract the attention of a few of the ignorant rabble! and that such are the chief part of the European inhabitants of Canada, is undoubtedly true: the new settlers are, in general, the very refuse of France, of very mean origin, and those who had no other prospect to get a livelihood, than by flying from their native country. Need we likewise wonder that their numbers have encreased, when they have been suffered to possess such an additional territory by encroachments? Suppose, agreeable to a late calculation, that Canada is one thousand eight hundred miles in length, and one thousand, two hundred, and sixty in breadth, I would be glad to know, whether according to the usual method of calculating, the number of inhabitants are in the least proportion to the extent of country? The most extravagant account of the French has fixed the number of the inhabitants of Canada considerably within one hundred and fifty thousand; but they are generally computed at less than one hundred thousand. Even admit the former, it must imply that Canada is greatly deficient in inhabitants; and therefore must

con-



convince us that the soil is very barren, and the means of getting a livelihood very difficult. It is known that the climate about Lake Champlain, and the other lakes, which include their encroachments, and which they have so long been endeavouring to possess themselves of, is more mild, and the soil more fertile than in Canada. Divest them of these alone, and we should soon find an amazing diminution in the number of inhabitants; divest them of these, and we should soon find, if Canada is restored, as amazing a decrease in their fur trade; for most of the skins they send to Europe come from thence, and in such quantity, that Lahontan tells us, that three fourths of them come from thence, even in his time, when the French had such little intercourse with the Indians about these lakes.

The public papers have likewise been very liberal in magnifying the fertility of Canada, but I think with very little foundation, and I believe to as little purpose. Indeed it is inconceivable to me, how a country so far to the north, and subject to such piercing frosts, the greater part of the year can be so very fertile. As the frost is apt to penetrate very deep, and continues so long, it must render the natural quality of the earth benumb'd and inactive, while it continues, especially as at that time the farmer is disabled from giving it the necessary culture: therefore the difficulty of vegetation, in a country where the extremity of the cold is so piercing and permanent the greater part of the year, is very obvious, and must undoubtedly be more so, with those commodities, that require a longer stay in the earth, to attain their natural perfection than others. Thus the growth of wheat, which generally remains nine months in the earth even in England, must meet with greater obstacles



cles than barley or oats, which remain but about four. Besides, as the surface of the earth, to a considerable depth, is rendered so hard by the frost, it must be impossible for the blade of the plant to shoot up spontaneously: an infinite deal of labour must therefore have been requisite among the Canadian farmers to open the furrows, and give the plants all the assistance of art in their power, while they are growing; for, if the culture bestowed on plants in general is beneficial, it must certainly be more so to those that remain longest in the ground.

Great care must also have been taken by the Canadian farmers every season, that their lands were well cleaned of the stubble of the former crops, in order to render them fit for the reception of the seed, and the necessary culture; otherwise the plants would be liable to be rooted up by plowing. And even admit that the soil of Canada had been originally ever so fertile, it must have been greatly impaired since; Canada being such a woody country, the farmer could not remove from his old farm to cultivate fresh lands at pleasure, as the difficulty of clearing the ground of the trees and stumps must be infinite, and in most parts impracticable: their usual settlements must therefore have lost their former virtue by such frequent culture, and the quantity of their produce must have decreased every succeeding year. They must likewise have required a great deal of manure, which, by its nutritive juice and warmth, might qualify the soil for vegetation; and, after all the difficulties of Nature are surmounted by this laborious and expensive toil, when the plants had acquired a considerable growth, is it reasonable to suppose that they could



could totally withstand every future inclemency of weather? Do not even the husbandmen of England (a climate infinitely more mild than Canada) often have their crops blighted by one night's frost? and will it be said, they are not more liable to these calamities in Canada? and, as the difficulties of growing wheat were so great, by reason of the long stay it required in the ground, before it could acquire its natural perfection, it may reasonably be conceived, that the Canadians never exported any considerable quantity of flour, if any at all; and this is a prime article of the provision trade to the Sugar Islands.

If we want farther proof of the climate of Canada, we need only ask our brave soldiers who have been there: they will inform us, that several of their most hardy comrades have lost the use of their limbs merely from the effects of the weather; nay, that some of their officers also (whose difference of living one would think a security against this evil) have been rendered infirm: Brigadier Murray himself, if I am not mistaken, makes such a complaint in his letter, on the surrender of Montreal and all Canada.

The assertion, that Canada supplied their Sugar Islands with provisions, is likewise very doubtful. I have already explained myself with regard to all kinds of corn, which could not grow in any abundance, not only from the disfavour of the climate, but likewise of the soil, which is a mixture of sand and stones, and therefore naturally very unfit for vegetation. It must at least be allowed, that Canada produced but a very small quantity of corn more than sufficient for the occasions of its own inhabitants. I have the authority of Charlevoix  
in



levoix in this print \*, the great demands the Canadians had for it to give their cattle in winter, rendered it impossible.

\* “ The winter (says he) commonly begins before the vessels set sail  
“ in order to return to France, and always in such a manner, as to asto-  
“ nish every one, except the natives of the place. The first frosts, in a  
“ few days, fill the rivers with ice, and the earth is soon covered with  
“ snow, which continues for six months, and is always six feet deep in  
“ places not exposed to the wind.

“ It is true there is no want of wood to guard against the cold, which  
“ very soon becomes extreme, and encroaches greatly on the spring: but  
“ it is, however, something extremely shocking, not to be able to stir out  
“ of doors without being frozen, at least without being wrapt up in furs  
“ like a bear. Moreover what a spectacle is it to behold one continued  
“ tract of snow, which pains the sight, and hides from our view all the  
“ beauties of nature? No more difference between the rivers and fields,  
“ no more variety, even the trees are covered with snow-frost, with large  
“ icicles depending from all their branches, under which you cannot pass  
“ with safety. What can a man think, who sees the horses with beards  
“ of ice more than a foot long; and who can travel in a country, where,  
“ for the space of six months, the bears themselves dare not shew their  
“ faces to the weather? Thus I have never passed a winter in this coun-  
“ try, without seeing some one or other carried to the hospital, and who  
“ was obliged to have his legs or arms cut off, on account of their being  
“ benumbed and frozen. In a word, if the sky is clear, the wind which  
“ blows from the west, is intolerably piercing. If it turns to the south  
“ or east, the weather becomes a little more moderate, but so thick a snow  
“ falls, that there is no seeing ten paces before you, even at noon day. On  
“ the other hand, if a compleat thaw comes on, farewell to the yearly  
“ stock of capons, quarters of beef and mutton, poultry, and fish, which  
“ they had laid up in granaries, depending on the continuance of the frost;  
“ so that in spite of the excessive severity of the cold, people are reduced  
“ to the necessity of wishing for its continuance.” Charl. p. 252, 254,  
letter 10.

And a little after, he says (p. 255,) “ After all, these colds so long and  
“ so severe, are attended with inconveniences, which can never thorough-  
“ ly be remedied. I reckon in the first place the difficulty of feeding the  
“ cattle, which during the whole winter season can find nothing in the  
“ fields, and, consequently, the preserving them must be extremely ex-  
“ pensive, while their flesh, after being kept six months on dry food, must



possible. And if this natural scarcity of corn had not subsisted, the immense expence of maintaining cattle and poultry with it all winter, must still have greatly prevented the growth of them, as indeed was the case, for it is an undoubted truth, that many of the farmers in Canada, made it a practice of killing them in autumn, to avoid the vast expence of maintaining them during the winter: so that the greatest part of the year the inhabitants chiefly lived upon salted meats and fish. And farther, to ascertain how small the trade was from Canada to the French sugar islands with provisions, we need only enquire what quantities of beef and pork have been frequently exported directly from England and Ireland, and indirectly from our own northern colonies, sometimes on their own bottom, and at others by means of their correspondence with the Dutch and Danes. Those articles generally comprized under the denomination of Lumber, they, indeed, might send to the islands, but this was carried on in such a manner, as scarce to deserve our notice, and the name of a branch of commerce. The demands of the Canadians, as I have said before, being greater for European commodities, than they could return in furs, they generally supplied the deficiency by a cargo of lumber, which the European ships carried to the sugar islands, and there got in exchange sugar, coffee, indigo, &c. which they brought

“ have lost all its relish. Corn is also necessary for the poultry, and great  
 “ care must be taken to keep them alive during so long a time. If to  
 “ avoid expence, all those beasts are killed about the end of October, which  
 “ are intended for consumption, before the month of May, you may easily  
 “ judge how insipid this sort of victuals must be, and from the manner  
 “ in which they catch fish through the ice, it appears this cannot be very  
 “ plentiful, besides its being frozen from the very first; so that it is al-  
 “ most impossible to have it fresh in the season, when it is most wanted.

to



to Europe, and this kind of traffic generally made near a whole year's voyage. Other ships were solely freighted with furs, or sometimes partly paid in bills of exchange directly for Europe; but much the greatest part of the ships from France to Canada, resorted to the fishery, in the mouth of the river St. Laurence, and off the banks of Newfoundland: so that one way or other, they all of them generally got home loaded. But is not this a further proof of the extreme poverty of Canada? Canada itself could not near supply them with sufficient commodities to go freighted home, or any other market. And if they had not found a remedy in the fishery, the whole colony of Canada would, very probably, have been long ago neglected, or abandoned by the inhabitants, for the imports from France must have been consequently much enhanced in value for want of a freight home. In short, if the Canadians have in any respect become rivals, or formidable to our colonies, so as to require such an effectual check, as the retention of their whole country, have we not been conducive, nay have we not been principals in the means of making them so? Was it not the treachery and iniquitous practices of our traders, that alienated from us the affections of the Indians who, till then, kept in awe all Canada? Did not the administration neglect to reform the abuses in this matter? Was it not rather conceived good policy to promote dissensions among the different tribes, to urge them to a war with the French, and then shamefully desert them, with a view, as they themselves found, if not of extirpating their whole generation, at least of checking their future growth? Did not proceedings like these, and these alone, force them to carry their furs to the Canadians, and to have dealings with a people,



against whom they had the strongest natural prejudices and hereditary enmity, and with whom they had lived in perpetual war? Did not the French on the contrary, very much improve their good understanding with them, not only in the way of fair trade, but conformity to their way of living, and intermarriage among them? Need we wonder then, that a behaviour so opposite had such opposite effects? Be the Indians ever so deceitful and vindictive, they have sensations of humanity, and ideas of generosity; nor can we justly upbraid them with treachery and barbarity, against whom we have so largely played the same weapons: but without moralizing farther, let me advise, that before we impeach the honesty of others, we learn to be honest ourselves; I am sure it is full time. While the natives were our friends, had we any apprehensions of danger from the French power in Canada? No; our colonies were not obliged to maintain so many forts on their frontiers, they enjoyed all the happiness of peace and security; if the Canadians attempted any encroachments on our claims, though at the distance of two or three hundred miles from our settlements, they were constantly drove away by these people, such was their good faith and amity toward us. Was it not their defect alone that enabled the French to pursue the ambitious schemes they had formed against us in America, and which they found were disregarded by our administration in England? And yet notwithstanding the large addition of territory they acquired, and their influence over the most distant tribes of Indians, what great advantages did France receive from this their reputed invaluable colony? Is it not really to be admired, is it not worth our consideration, to find that its amount, in the most flourishing times, exceeded



ceeded little more than one hundred and thirty five thousand pounds ; and even then, that it produced no balance in favour of Canada ; the inhabitants never had a sufficiency to return in exchange for common necessities : and if we deduct the value of those commodities that enabled them to carry on the trade with the Indians, such as brandy, fire-arms, powder, blankets, and several kinds of trinkets and utensils, and the freightage of them from France, what could be the amount of the clear profits of these skins to the merchant ? Did the exports from Canada ever employ many ships ? Did they ever much add to the French naval power ? Did they, when imported, bring any considerable addition to the French revenue ? so far from it, Sir, that we were told by the Remarker, and with a great deal of truth, that “ the whole produce of Canada, though it were all exported from England, and exported compleatly manufactured, would not amount to the value of ” the “ single article ” of sugar from Guadalupe “ unmanufactured : nor would it employ the one twentieth part of the shipping and the seamen.”

By the retention of Canada one would, no doubt, expect that the French would be entirely excluded from Cape Breton, and all their right to, and share in the fishery. Will not then impartial men be amazed, when they hear, that if we retain Canada, “ the French \* ” are still to enjoy “ the right given ” them by “ the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht, to fish in some parts of these seas : ” and that “ Cape Breton ” is to “ be left open to them,” because truly this and that Great Man conceives the refusal would be rather unreasonable,” and because “ a few men of war kept at Hal-

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 32.



“ Halifax, will effectually prevent Louisbourg’s being again  
 “ made a place of strength.” What, Sir, can we  
 think, when we see the continuance of a mere privilege  
 so strenuously recommended, which there is the greatest  
 reason possible to wish revoked? We, Sir, who so much  
 lament the growth of French power, and their strength  
 by sea; we, Sir, who have seen this very privilege abused,  
 who have heard them treat our fishers with all imagin-  
 able insolence and lawless despotism; who have seen  
 them supplant us at the foreign market even in that com-  
 modity, which is judged so very “ unreasonable” to re-  
 fuse them. In short, Sir, we, who after a truce of about  
 eight years, from a bloody and expensive war, and when  
 the prosecution of another, has almost reduced us to a  
 national bankruptcy, are, I am sorry to say it by such  
 good advice, and well concerted schemes as this, in a  
 fair way of repeating that universal carnage that hath of  
 late years desolated Europe worse than a pestilence, and  
 sinking under a burthen that may render Britain no  
 longer a commercial kingdom, and Britons no longer  
 a free people.

Can we doubt, Sir, that if France was suffered to  
 repossess Cape-Breton, that, she would repeople it  
 and re-fortify it; I say, Sir, can we doubt it, when we  
 have such bare-faced instances of her perfidy in the  
 present strength of Dunkirk, and the late encroach-  
 ments on our colonies; the former of which they for-  
 tified under our very noses, and the latter of which  
 they got possession of by our own supineness; for we  
 were ocular witnesses of their motions, nay, were pre-  
 viously acquainted with their intentions. If, in the  
 terms of a future peace, we should exact a particular  
 stipulation from France, that we should even be at li-  
 berty



berty to take periodical observations and nice surveys of the state of Cape-Breton in the times of peace, would not France find the means to evade the executive part of that stipulation, even supposing that future administrations should be inclined to adhere strictly to the tenor of it, a circumstance very much to be feared? the special pretexts of sheltering the inhabitants, and protecting them against any irruption of the savages from the neighbouring continent, must be allowed to have some influence; and being so plausible, would be ever palliative of their breach of faith. What then would be the consequence? Should we not soon see Louisbourg once more become that formidable bulwark, that invaluable Dunkirk of America, which we ever considered it to be? Should we not again experience the defection of the treacherous Arcadians? Would not France always take care to keep a numerous garrison in Cape-Breton? Would they not again carry fire and sword into our infant settlements in Nova Scotia? Would not our share in the Fishery be at their mercy? Could a single ship go to Canada without passing Cape-Breton; Must they not even go in sight of it, excepting when the air should be foggy, or our ships should find themselves under a necessity of taking their passage through the Streights of Bellisle, a passage infinitely more tedious and dangerous? could we, therefore, in the time of war, avoid the total destruction of our trade to Canada, and the Fishery, without keeping fleets to block up the port? And would not the keeping such fleets be always necessary, and consequently always a vast expence to the nation, and such as, in the time of war, would greatly overbalance the amount of the exports from Canada even in the time of peace? Is this the way, Sir, to procure  
 the



the much desired solid peace for England, and for Europe? Is it the way to shew “ France that” we “ know” our “ true interests, and are resolved steadily “ to pursue them \*?” would not “ a peace” upon this system, be rather “ treacherous and delusive?” Should we not too soon experience, that Louisbourg would, in every respect, become more formidable and detrimental to us than Dunkirk ever was, or ever can be? Would not posterity hereafter admire, that England could have a M——r remarkable for his perspicuity, and unusually distinguished for his attachment to the interests of his country, so egregiously imposed on, and who could be consistently guilty of such a manifest default, blunder, or whatever you please to term it? in the name of decency and good manners, let us not cast such an affront on common sense.

I would not, Sir, judge too harshly, I would be rather too sparing of censure; but how can I refrain a little ebullition of temper, when I see a system actually adopted, that is in itself so absurd and inconsistent; the demolition of “ the fortifications of Louisbourg †,” was to be the prelude to this fanciful farce, a farce which has taken place in action, and, if I am rightly informed, had been adopted, in the refined negotiation; it is therefore full time, before the curtain is dropt, to put a check to its future progress. The absurdity of demolishing the fortifications of Louisbourg is self evident, and the more so upon the pretence, that “ a few men of war “ kept at Halifax, will effectually prevent” its “ being “ again made a place of strength.” The whole must

\* Letter to two great men.

† Ibid.

there-



therefore depend upon the reasonableness of keeping the whole island of Cape-Breton from the hands of France, which is a point I shall consider hereafter: it is sufficient at present, that the retention of these islands and the fishery, has not been urged, by the advocates, as an inducement for retaining Canada.

I persuade myself, Sir, you will excuse my conversing with you so freely, and delivering my sentiments so plainly, I mentioned to you at my first setting off, I had not studied the art of adulation, if I can acquit myself of my present task in the language of common sense, it is as much I can aim at. We are all of us apt, Sir, to talk presumptively upon matters of sentiment; if therefore I anticipate the future situation of Canada, whether intended to be retained or not, and give you something of my ideas, or rather to ask some general questions, what it would be under an English government, I hope I shall be entitled to the excuse.

Must it not be allowed, Sir, that under an English government, ships cannot “ come to the West-India “ market from the bottom of the river St. Laurence, “ with the gross and cheap article of lumber upon a “ footing with our colonies, many of which are not “ three weeks sail from them.” But as to this branch, Sir, I believe, it is given up by the strongest advocates of that system. As an English colony will not Canada be subject to certain limits, as is the case with our other colonies? Would not this of course greatly reduce the amount of their exports in furs? Will the Canadians then have the command of the beautiful banks of the Ohio, or the Great Lakes? Can they have possession of lands, included in the grants of other colonies, or of those tracts, for which contracts have been already made with private companies? On the contrary must not the

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whole



whole trade of Canada be confined within the barren tract to the east of the Upper Lake, and Hudson's-Bay? As English subjects, will not the Canadians lose their influence over the Indians? would not these latter look upon them as natives of England? and would they, in in such case, carry their skins as far as Montreal, when they could do it so much more conveniently at Niagara and Oswego, for an equal, if not larger gratuity?

But suppose, Sir, that the Canadians should have liberty given them to resort to the lakes, and about the Forks of the Ohio, and have established marts there at certain seasons of the year, would they carry the skins to Canada, when they might dispose of them so much more conveniently to factors in Virginia or Maryland? The heads of the rivers Potomack and Susquehanna, that fall into Chesapeak Bay, interlock with the branches of the Ohio about Pittsburg, and thereby afford an inland navigation from the Ohio through the Apalacheon mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, and a carriage thither be much shorter and safer, than by navigating the lakes Erie and Ontario, down the River Caderacqui, so to Montreal, Quebec, and up the River St. Laurence? Would not likewise even the inhabitants within the precincts of Canada, consign their commodities to factors at New-York? Would it not be more to their advantage than sending them by way of the River St. Laurence? The navigation of Lake Champlain and Hudson's River would be much shorter, and safer, and consequently much cheaper.

Thus, Sir, would not the Canadians have all the drudgery of getting the skins, and the Virginians, Marylanders, or New-Yorkers, the benefit of the sale? Would not these latter likewise supply the Canadians with



with English manufactures, &c. much cheaper by means of this inland navigation, than we could directly from England by the way of the River St. Laurence? Would not the greater distance and danger of the voyage by way of the River St. Laurence; and necessary detention of the ship and crew, in disembarking their commodities, and loading again, of course enhance the price? Thus, Sir, is it not likely that England will receive very little addition in ships or sailors, by retaining Canada, at all events, much less than France did, tho' so very inconsiderable; nay, perhaps, that scarce a dozen ships would enter the River St. Laurence bound to any port in Canada within a whole year?

If the French inhabitants should retire from their settlements in Canada (which I am persuaded most of them would) can we expect that it will become well peopled from our own colonies, when we have such immense tracts on the same continent, infinitely more commodious and inviting, such as in Nova-Scotia, about the lakes, and every part beyond the mountain? If this "objection is founded on ignorance of the nature  
" of population in new countries \*; I will acknowledge I am unhappy enough to deserve that censure; but, if the "population" of "new countries" depends, as I conceive it does, on "the pleasantness, fertility, and  
" plenty of such new countries †," and the inhabitants "encrease in proportion as the means and facility of  
" gaining a livelihood encrease ‡," then I do not deserve that censure, but the author himself; for the climate of Canada is far from being pleasant, the soil far from be-

\* Interest of Great Britain, &c. p. 45.

† Ibid. p. 24.

‡ Ibid. p. 25.



ing fertile, nor has it a plenty of any vendible commodity.

To be brief, Sir, is it not something paradoxical, if not inconsistent, that Canada, being of so very little importance to France, can be so much the greater to us? as being the only northern colony they possessed, they certainly had it in their power to make its commodities turn to greater account than we can ever expect to do? You certainly, Sir, do not think we can receive greater advantages from it in a commercial view than France has done before us: it is beyond possibility. Is there not rather the greatest reason to expect that the Canadians, by losing the commerce of the great lakes and the Forks of the Ohio, would decrease in their exports of furs, at least one half? Would not their demands, in that case, on Great-Britain decrease in proportion? And how they could find wherewithal to keep life and soul together, is to me very questionable; for, by the loss of their establishment on the Great Lakes, Canada would lose very few of its own proper inhabitants, although the later settlers should continue there; for these settlements were formed chiefly for supporting their garrisons, and to preserve a communication with the Indians.

The military invalids, civilized Indians, and the spare hands of the garrison were employed in cultivating these settlements, but no farther than was sufficient for their own wants: the Coureurs de Bois went with the commodities necessary for the Indian trade, and brought back in return their skins. No other commercial intercourse subsisted between Canada and their settlements about the lakes. In a word, Sir, I would be glad to know what imaginary form of government we are to assume in Canada; what inversion is proposed to be made in the civil polity, and what kind of innovations in the commercial system;



tem. Is England to pay all the necessary officers of the civil establishment? Is England to defray all the charges of repairing and maintaining the fortifications? If so, where is the fund to do it? Must England, likewise, be obliged to keep a numerous force in Canada to overawe the inhabitants? Will not this be even necessary to bring specie into the colony; for if it does not come by this channel, how can it come at all? Canada can have no ballance in her favour from her own commodities, and, can have no money, but by virtue of the royal establishment: and if such establishment was necessary under the French, will it not be more so under us? even the whole value of the exports from Canada would be scarce sufficient to pay its own civil officers, much less the charges of maintaining their fortifications. Are the imports and exports to and from Canada to be exempted from the usual duties on their entry and clearance? If they were subject to such duties, would not the price of commodities be much enhanced, and the Canadians rendered more unable to pay for them? And if the exemption was to take place, would it not be so much clear loss to the revenue? So that in every case, is not the mother-country sure to suffer by retaining Canada? In a word, Sir, by retaining it, we can expect it to become no other than a colony, without trade and inhabitants. Let the advocates for the retention, give me the least prospect of its being made of any real utility and emolument to the mother country (be it ever so small;) and I will not avail myself of its very numerous and peculiar disadvantages, very peculiar indeed! But I am apprehensive that this cannot be done. It cannot be said, Sir, that we should retain Canada, because there is reason to suspect the French will prove troublesome

some



some neighbours, we might as well apply this doctrine to every colony the French are possessed of, and even to France itself. But did the possession of Canada give the French any superiority over us, either on the principles of power or commerce? Was it not our own unparalleled negligence that raised them from the very extremity of beggary and contempt, and made them become formidable to us? It cannot be said, Sir, that before the French got possession of the lakes, and prevailed upon our Indian allies to abandon our interest, and take part with them, that England had any thing to apprehend from the excessive growth of French power from that colony, so far from this, did not our own colonies hold Canada in such a piteous light, that they seldom engaged vigorously in a war against it? When they were inclined to correspond with Canada in this manner, did they not set the Indians on; and did not they alone prove sufficient to keep the Canadians in the most abject awe and subjection?

But wherefore should I be surprized at finding Canada ever so deficient for England, in a commercial view, or even of any importance at all, when we have been very modestly given to understand that the “proposed demand of Canada is,” partly “founded on the little value of” it “to the French\* ;” an assertion so plain and simply honest in itself, that I believe, Sir, I had no occasion to have enlarged in the manner I have done: however, as I have entered the lists, it is fit I should acquit myself with becoming courage and resolution, and shall, therefore proceed on the object of contention. Another part of the foundation is said to be “the right we have to ask, and the power “we may have to insist on an indemnification for our

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 4, and 5.



expences †." But this is a very shallow argument; for, have we not, Sir, the same right to ask, and the same possibility (the author implies no more) of a power, to insist on an indemnification as well by retaining any other conquest as Canada? Most certainly we have, and most certainly we ought, to make our preference subordinate to our own interests and not the convenience of an enemy. The other part of the argument is said to be "the difficulty the French themselves will be under of retaining their restless subjects in America from encroaching on our limits, and disturbing our trade, and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge ‡." But as this part entirely depends on the objects of our demands in North America, and in fact would be the only material foundation for us to keep Canada, I shall consider that point pretty largely. I do not mean to insist merely on the disadvantages of the commerce of Canada, my intention is not to cavil upon particulars, but to obviate every cause for it hereafter. If the possession of Canada would give us that security we want, or, at least, ought to want, in North America, or would prove of any great detriment to the future growth of power in France, I would readily wave them as inconsiderable. I do not think either of these will be the consequence, and shall presently give my reasons why I think so; and if it is found that Canada will not give us such security, wherefore should we incumber ourselves with it, when it would prove a dead load of expence to us? and wherefore should we pay such a regard to the French, when it would prove a dead load of expence to them? It could

† Interest of Great Britain, p. 5.

‡ Ibid.



be for no other reason than might arise from an overstrained complaisance, because it would be of little value to them.

The security desirable in America, we have been informed “ may be considered as of three kinds. 1st, A “ security of possession that the French shall not drive “ us out of the country. 2dly, A security of our planters from the inroads of the savages, and the murders “ committed by them. 3dly, A security that the British nation shall not be obliged on every new war to “ repeat the immense expence occasioned by this to defend its possessions in America \*.” I agree with the author in the propriety of these heads, but when he says that “ all” these “ kinds of security are obtained by subduing and retaining Canada,” and that “ the Indians” will have “ no other Europeans near them “ that can either supply them, or instigate them against “ us † ;” I cannot but disagree with him there, it is an assertion altogether false and extravagant: I cannot but think the retention of this same Canada will be deficient in all these points, and that in no small measure too. The author certainly could not be so ignorant of the limits of Canada, to mean as he would seem to imply; he could not, with any regard to candour, or with a view to benefit the subject, set up a pretence so repugnant to the intent of the French settlements in North America, and the nature of their claims there. Does France claim any right to the Ohio, as appertaining to Canada? Does any one conceive that France would set up a claim upon a principle so absurd? It is true the grant of Louisiana to Mons. Crozat, is not of itself, a sufficient authority to insist on any precise boundaries to

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 10.

Ibid. p. 14.



Louisiana ; the patent is couched in very obscure terms, and the original expression, in some places, very ambiguous. It tells us, one part of Louisiana is bounded by the river Illinois, but whether by the mouth or source of that river is left undetermined, and the eastern boundary is entirely so. This obscurity might be affected intentionally ; and indeed with good reason : for as this settlement was an illegal usurpation, not only on the crown of Spain, but that of England, and was put in execution immediately after the treaty of Utrecht, it behoved France to keep her views in this settlement, as secret as possible. But let us only consider with a little more reflection, and the matter will illustrate itself. The Ohio is cut off from Canada by the intermediate territories of some of our colonies and the Six Nations, a people whom France has formally acknowledged by treaty to be subject to England, and whose territories extend over most of the lakes, and the circumjacent country. France therefore, could not, consistently with her former conduct, she could not, with the least colour, assume a right to the Ohio as appertaining to Canada. The nature of the French claim to all the territories they assume to themselves in Canada and Louisiana, is still a stronger evidence to my present purpose. France settles at the mouths of the two rivers St. Laurence and Mississippi, and on that foundation builds a right to the whole extent of those rivers, and their several branches, and the rivers that communicate with them ; it is, in fact, the only principle on which she *can* found a right to the large territories claimed by her in North America : therefore the Illinois, Ohio, Wabache, Cherokee, and the other lesser rivers that communicate with the Mississippi were undoubtedly



meant to be included in Louisiana. Besides there may still be a more natural reason, why the boundaries of Louisiana were not primarily more clearly pointed out, than an apprehension of the consequences arising from an illegal usurpation. The grant to Crozat was the effect of a chimerical imagination, and made at a time when the French were entirely ignorant of the nature and extent of the country they were about to settle, as will evidently appear from a slight inspection into the patent; and that they did not even mean to confine themselves to any particular boundaries as evidently appears from the reservations contained in it. And what renders the assertion less plausible and absurd is, that agreeable to the report of the commissaries after the treaty of Utrecht, the western frontier of Canada is limited by the river Utawawa, which falls into the river St. Laurence, near Montréal; and, even according to the modest limitation of French hydrographers\*, it included only the great lakes. I will acknowledge the possession of Canada might secure our northern colonies of Nova Scotia, and New England; but, it is evident, at the first view, it could not in the least benefit the colonies of New York, Pensylvania, Maryland, Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia.

Agreeable to a late calculation it appeared that the northern colonies of New England and New York, have very near as many inhabitants as all the southern colonies put together. We have likewise been told that the single province of New York has upwards of fifty forts to defend it against an enemy, and that it can muster as many combatants as all the southern colonies to-

\* This is agreeable to Lahontan, and most of the French writers, &c. M. de Lisle bounds one part of Louisiana by Pensylvania and New-York; and according to Le Lieur Louisiana may extend even to the North Pole.

gether,



the fort from an incapacity, either from the want of stores or men, to defend it, might they not demolish it, or might they not retire down the river to some distance, and attack it with greater vigour, upon receiving a reinforcement?

If they should not chuse to come to open violence, might they not succeed without going towards that fort, and without committing any act of hostility, by means of the rivers Miamis and Wabache, both which rise within a few miles of the south-west coast of Lake Erie, and very near Detroit, or the Streights which join that with Lake Huron? Would it not then be very easy for the French in Louisiana to make incursions into our settlements there, if not cut off all communication from thence to our colonies? The general method of traffic carried on by the natives and traders in parts to the west of the Lakes, was by navigating from the upper Lake and Lake Michigan into Lake Huron, and so into Lakes Erie and Ontario, after having conveyed their commodities over their portage at Niagara; if to a French market, Frontenac, or Montreal; if to an English one, Oswego, or Albany: the single capture of Detroit would therefore effectually prevent any intercourse of this kind between those Indians and Canada, or any other of our colonies.

Need we doubt, likewise, that they would neglect their old track by the way of the River Illinois, before they found out a more convenient one by the River Ohio? Our settlements at Missilimakinac cannot be considered as a proper barrier, they could make but very little opposition against any enemy, much less against such a one as France at all times provided with all the requisites of war.



war. In any attempt of the French, can we in the least assure ourselves of the fidelity of the Indians? might they not with great probability become abettors in all the schemes of the French, who have acquired but too much the art of conciliating the affections of the most savage among them. The tribes that inhabit these parts, and call themselves the Ten Nations, are as numerous as any other associated confederacy of Indians in North America, have been in strong alliance with the French; there still are (tho' in disguise) several of French extraction, and many of them of the military kind. What therefore have we not to apprehend? the forts at Missilimakinac and Detroit would have the whole force of Louisiana to contend with, and very probably a combination of the Indians; and thus backed, could we expect to keep possession of those forts? Could we draw together a sufficient force to repel the invaders? Could we attack them with the least advantage? Could we supply an army at such a distance from our proper frontier? the consequences of a repulse from such invaders, who come prepared for slaughter, would be truly horrible; let us recollect that of Braddock's, and tremble at the apprehensions of such another!

Success, either by the River Illinois or Ohio, would likewise give the French a very considerable share of the fur trade. The country for several miles between Lake Erie and part of the Ohio, is reckoned the chief spot for hunting among the Indians in North-America, on account of the great resort of deer and beaver to the salt pits which are there in great abundance: and the country to the west and north of the Upper Lake is undoubtedly well situated for the same trade. The Indians for  
several



several score miles thereabouts resort to the English mart in Hudson's-Bay. Would not then an establishment of the French in those parts, be of the greatest detriment to us by losing so considerable a share of that trade, and, being so beneficial to them, can we flatter ourselves, they would be wanting in a proper exertion to effect such establishment? Nor could it be expected that the Indians would undertake a long peregrination to dispose of their commodities to our colonies, when they might do it upon their own spot so much more conveniently to the French with equal, if not greater advantage; for it has been remarkable, that the French would rather give an advanced price, than suffer our traders to outbid them: a policy encouraged by their government, which hath frequently reimbursed the losses of their subjects in Canada on this occasion.

Will not the French also have the same advantage over our southern colonies by means of the Catawba, Cumberland, and Wood rivers, and particularly that of the Cherokees, a branch of which rises near the heads of the rivers Chatahoochee and Coussa, which communicate with the Gulph of Mexico? Do not these rivers afford the prospect of a most extensive intercourse by inland navigation over the whole country, beyond the Apalachian mountains, belonging to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia? while the French have any footing with the Indians in those parts, or hold the least possession among them, shall we not always have broils and dissensions among them? The Indians beyond those mountains are severed from our colonies by a barrier naturally strong and important, the Apalachian mountains; and, at the same time, greatly secured by this barrier against any offensive attempt from our colonies?



nies? They are, on the other hand, wholly exposed to the French from the Mississippi, particularly all the Over-hill towns?

We have already experienced the difficulty of passing those mountains, and attacking the Indians: but their settlements being chiefly spread along the banks of the Cherokee River, and its branches, might not the French, by the easy navigation thereof, disembark, and attack them in the very heart of their country, without any of the inconveniences attending a land march? Have we not the greatest reason possible to secure the confidence of these Indians on the back of our southern colonies, when they have hitherto been esteemed the only barrier to our colonies on that side against the designs of the French; a barrier, Sir, the more important, as those colonies are intirely unable to defend themselves in our whole security hitherto has depended, and, while the French have any settlement on the Mississippi, must always depend on the good inclinations towards us. But can we expect this while the the French have any settlement on the Mississippi? Can we hereafter expect to enjoy a union of them in our interests, when it will be so inconsistent with common sense; and, perhaps, their natural inclinations?

But, let us farther suppose that, at a future negotiation we should not only require the absolute cession of Canada, but insist likewise that the French should confine themselves to the westward of the Mississippi, and leave us the whole south and east territory to the very banks of that river, including the great rivers Illinois and Ohio. Would such an extraordinary cession secure us against the future inconveniences of war, against encroachments,  
or



or actual hostilities? According to the most enlarged ideas of the nature of population, it would be a work of many score years before such a large tract as that beyond the mountains could become well settled; tho' I am inclined to think, that no considerable settlement beyond the mountains will ever take place while the French are possessed of the Mississippi: for, only consider the nature of the country beyond the mountains, divided from the coasts toward the Atlantic ocean by almost impenetrable thickets and rugged eminencies, with no natural nor artificial roads to favour an inland carriage; and can we expect such inland carriage will ever subsist? Will not settlers have these difficulties to encounter; and will not the neighbourhood of the French in Louisiana, ever be a check to such as are inclined to settle there.

Security of possession, Sir, is not the least advantage in forming colonies, nor the smallest temptation to invite settlers; and that for a reason very plain: when a man continues no longer a journeyman, but sets up for himself he does it with a view to enlarge his property, and render his life more comfortable; but, if that property is liable to a continual danger of being taken from him, and his life at the mercy of a perfidious enemy, he would undoubtedly rather continue a journeyman in safety, than be a master at the great hazard of his life?

But, to go on with the enquiry, shall we not, (tho' we retain Canada,) be put to an immense expence in erecting, not stockadoes, but respectable forts, at proper distances, on the banks of the Mississippi, all the way from its risings to its influx into the Gulph of Mexico, an extent of some thousand miles? The source of the Mississippi is not yet known, but the river has been



traced upwards of nine hundred leagues, and this is a frontier so extensive, that it will require many score thousand pounds annually to defend it, after the necessary chain of forts have been erected to keep the French within their boundaries. Must we not likewise have forts at the most convenient passes in the inland country to keep open a communication with their respective governments of Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia? And, after all those forts have been erected, how are they to be supplied; and how can they be effectually supported? Most of these forts will be two or three hundred leagues distant from the capitals of those provinces, and the usual residence of the governors: and those forts on the Mississippi will be many of them near as many thousand miles; they would be in a manner divided from them by a large uncultivated track, inhabited by sculking parties of savages, whose fickleness and natural treachery we have known too much of, to confide more largely in them for the future. As a people rigidly tenacious of their liberties and independency, would not a frequent passage through their territories be deemed a cause for suspecting our intentions? if the French or their priests could get privately among them, would they not be apt to put the worst construction on such passage? Would they not insinuate, that we had a design to enslave or extirpate their whole generation? This suggestion would rouse their sleeping suspicious humour; being naturally treacherous themselves, they have no better opinion of the rest of the human species, they would quickly take umbrage from such insinuations, which, in fact, would have a good foundation; for, by these forts we should entirely surround them; and the frequent intercourse between those forts  
and



and their seats of government, we should become acquainted with the most secret avenues of their power? Should we not then be always exposed to the effects of their jealousy? Would not the convoys be liable to be intercepted, our forts blocked up, and the garrisons starved upon the least variance with them? and would not the same differences still subsist between us and the French about the boundaries between us?

Both nations being settled on opposite banks of the Mississippi, might it not be the means of introducing a reciprocal trade very detrimental to the true interests of this nation? Would not there always remain a squabble about the sole property of the Mississippi? Would it not be a perpetual bone of contention? Would not both claim a right to the navigation of it? And as the French no sooner form a scheme, than they put it in execution, might they not easily interrupt the communication between our forts? Might they not cross the river, and make a conquest, not only before any reinforcement could be sent, but even before proper intelligence could be received of an attack; or if such intelligence was received before the necessary preparations could be expedited to relieve the garrison? We have an instance of this in the present war: how difficult has it proved to gain the least intelligence of the fate of Fort Loudoun? How many times was it reported to have been taken, and when it was taken, was it not with much ado credited?

Besides, Sir, what would be the consequence of confining the French even to the west of the Mississippi. The country, if we reckon to the parts inhabited by the subjects of Spain is of much greater extent than the habitable parts of Canada, the soil infinitely  
more



more fertile, and the climate infinitely more mild. The French would have many advantages there to render a settlement not only agreeable, but desirable, and they would have an extent of habitable country to secure them against apprehensions of a conquest by an enemy. We know the reason the French could not support themselves in Canada was a want of proper stores and forces which could not be conveyed to them, by any other channel than the river St. Laurence; and that was blocked up by our numerous fleets. But will they be liable to this inconvenience in Louisiana? might they not land their stores and reinforcements in many places in the gulph of Mexico, in a tract of several hundred miles?

But what is more to be feared than every other apprehension from this settlement of the French on the Mississippi, is their intercourse with the subjects of Spain. Might they not succeed in their encroachments here, as well as they have done in Hispaniola? We know what great profits they receive from this their surreptitious possession, and what encouragement it is to the public spirit for manufactures, of which it is a chief support; for from hence their commodities find their way to all South America. Our ancestors looked with contempt on the settlement of a few buccaniers on a spot neglected by Spain, by reason of its barrenness and unwholesome situation; which by the bye, were exaggerated beyond measure, and yet it has been this very barren and unwholesome spot that has chiefly contributed to aggrandize the French power. Our notions of their settlement on the Mississippi were exactly similar; we laughed at a settlement in a country which we represented as barren, marshy, and unwholesome, and gave it all the odious epithets that pre-



prejudice could devise. The foundation of these colonies being so similar, why may not the eventual effects be so likewise? I am persuaded, and I must insist, Sir, that in Louisiana, the French have infinitely a greater prospect to indulge their golden views, than they had from St. Domingo, or even from Canada, which we seem so much, and, indeed, so undeservedly, to prize. Before they made any settlement in Louisiana, they told us of the practicability of seizing the Spanish mines at St. Barbe; and if they should not find a beneficial intercourse with the Spanish subjects sufficient for their purpose, I dare say that they would not be wanting in industry to provide for themselves, which might, probably, end in the same connections between their subjects in Louisiana and Mexico, as there is in Hispaniola; an Event, Sir, we cannot be too secure in preventing. An administration of Great Britain, cannot be too attentive in preventing the growth of power in France, tho' at the expence of Spain, and rendering all future schemes tending to promote an union between these two powers, abortive. A connection of interest would engage a mutual intercourse, and certain immunities in favour of a trade between their respective subjects. Thus it happens with the French in Hispaniola, and so it would happen to them in Louisiana. If we admire at the security of their possessions in Hispaniola, let us do it no more; we do not attack France on that side, for fear of offending his Catholic Majesty, who might, perhaps, construe it as a breach of neutrality. Can it be said, Sir, that the same reason will not hereafter be equally prevalent for them in Louisiana. If the French should become powerful there, the Spaniards would be glad to  
keep



keep on good terms with them; but hitherto the French have been too diligent in their project for uniting their settlements in Canada and Louisiana, to have made any considerable progress toward the Spanish settlements. The King of Spain could not, therefore, with any propriety, take umbrage at our making a demand of this encroachment. He is thought not to be so over-partial to the French, and if he was ever so much inclined, would it not be extremely imprudent, to take part with them in their present unhappy circumstances, and would it not be contrary to the general disposition and interests of his subjects?

If I have been happy thus far, Sir, in representing the insufficiency of Canada, it will be necessary to consider a more proper object to engage our attention. It is absolutely necessary to lay some restraint on the French in North America, more than by divesting them of their encroachments, merely on our northern colonies, according to the Remarkers plan; for be the bounds between our colonies and theirs ever so clearly distinguished, if they remain in the possession of the rivers St. Lawrence and Mississippi, they will find means to evade the treaty, and again endeavour to unite their two colonies of Canada and Louisiana: one or other of these must therefore be entirely given up to us, which of them is the most proper, and will answer our views the most effectually, will best appear from the principles upon which the French have acted in North America; and even from thence, Sir, I do not doubt to make appear that the preference given to Canada, is a false deduction from just premises, and the mere phantom of a crude imagination. We have been told, that “the French  
“ seem to have had two capital views in all their  
“ Ame-



“ their American schemes, ever since they have thought  
 “ trade and commerce an object worthy of their atten-  
 “ tion. The first was to extend themselves from Canada  
 “ southwards, thro’ the lakes along the back of our co-  
 “ lonies ; by which means they might answer a double  
 “ purpose, of cutting off our communication with the  
 “ Indian nations, and of opening a communication for  
 “ themselves, between the rivers St. Laurence and Mis-  
 “ sissippi, and thus to join, as it were, their colonies  
 “ of Canada and Louisiana. The other part of their  
 “ plan, equally important, and more immediately fatal  
 “ to our interests in North America, was to gain a  
 “ communication with the ocean, the only access they”  
 had “ to Canada through the river St. Laurence, being  
 “ shut up half the year \*.” Now the only method  
 to ascertain these principles, will be to consider what  
 active measures have been prosecuted to secure  
 them ; and, in doing this, it will be found, that they  
 have attempted nothing toward the latter, “ part of  
 “ the plan”, to authorize a certainty even of the  
 suggestion. Their principal, their only view hitherto  
 has been, to unite Canada and Louisiana. If France  
 had not secured the command of Lake Champlain, we  
 might have made incursions into the very heart of Ca-  
 nada : their forts at Crown Point and Ticonderago,  
 were therefore necessary to their own security. If  
 France had intended to open a passage to the ocean  
 through New York, would she not have made greater  
 progress before this time ? They built Crown Point in  
 1731, at the time the dispute happened between Massa-  
 chusets Bay and New Hampshire, about their bounda-  
 ries. During this time, therefore, the French had a  
 most glorious opportunity for making farther encroach-

\* Letter to Two Great Men, p. 13 and 14.



ments. Can we doubt then, that they would not have made some attempts to effect a scheme we are to understand was held in such estimation by them? The issue of this contest gave France a still greater opportunity of doing it, for Lake Champlain and its territories were adjudged to New Hampshire, a colony in every respect unable to maintain or defend it. They afterwards devolved upon New York, and the same favourable opportunity still subsisted: for the dismemberment of the whole province of New Jersey from that government, and the succeeding quarrels between them about their boundaries, which were carried to such height, that they were upon the point of cutting one another's throats, and, above all, the primitive weakness of the colony of New York, rendered an attempt of that nature almost sure of success. Here, therefore, thirty years are elapsed, and not one single step taken to give the least colour to support even a bare suspicion of this design of the French, on which so much weight has been imposed; but rather the contrary. Did they not, after taking our fort of Saratoga (situate in the heart of New York) last war, demolish it? Did they not do the same this war by Oswego and Fort William Henry? But how differently have they acted in the prosecution of their other scheme! there we cannot but admire how vigorously they exerted themselves, and in what manner they succeeded! had they not, by means of their Forts Frontenac, Niagara, Venango, du Quesne, those at the junction of the Wabache with the Ohio, and the Ohio with the Mississippi, and several other intermediate forts effected this long wished for junction. Their opening a communication with the ocean, through the province of New York, if ever intended, could not then be "*equally important,*" nor

"*more*



“ *more* immediately fatal to our interests.” If it was actually intended, it was only a secondary object, or as I am now inclined to think rather a consequence of their success in the former. Fort du Quesne was to have been their *entrepot* between their two colonies of Canada and Louisiana, the link that formed the union; it might therefore in that case, have been necessary to have had some such port, as that of New York, on the Atlantic ocean, to be more convenient for their middle settlements, and to avoid such a tedious navigation, as they would have from thence either down the Mississippi, or up the river St. Laurence. And even admit that France had formerly held this project in such estimation, and had intended to put it in execution, it cannot, for the future, merit our least consideration as the two colonies of New England and New York, the frontier opponents against Canada on that side, are already sufficient of themselves to extirpate the French at any time from Canada. Besides the settlement of Nova Scotia was not then in agitation, but now we have so many inhabitants there, and that colony is daily encreasing in strength and populousness, the French would cut but a very indifferent figure in such an attempt hereafter. If we would then remove the cause of the French encroachments, the effects will cease; remove them from Louisiana, and we shall experience no more incroachments; remove them from Louisiana *alone*, and we shall quickly find Canada become the same poor infirm colony we had ever reason to believe it to be before they settled in Louisiana.

The reasons I have heard given for not attacking the French on the Mississippi have been, that it would not



answer the expence; that the climate was unhealthy, and the soil barren; and that the French were so weak there, that they could give us no cause for uneasiness: circumstances (say these knowing ones) manifested by the small progress the French have made, and the little disturbance they have given us this war; but give me leave to say, Sir, they are insinuations false and injurious, and propagated to serve particular purposes.

It is true, for about two hundred miles from New Orleans (the capital), the country in many parts being subject to inundations on account of the risings occasioned by the confluence of several large rivers into the Mississippi, the water stagnates in parts that are low; and the atmosphere thereby contracting a density and dampness, renders a residence, not so much unwholesome, as disagreeable; but these inundations are periodical; they only happen at that season when the freshes mix with the waters of the Mississippi; and are therefore inconveniencies that, one would be apt to think, might be removed by making trenches to draw off part of the water, and raising the banks of the Mississippi, where it might be found necessary to hinder the overflowing: they are schemes the French have been some time projecting, and no doubt a people so conspicuous for their ingenuity and industry, if suffered to possess the country, would succeed in the attempt.

But, if the country labours under these disadvantages towards the coast, higher up both the soil and climate are very different. The soil is amazingly fertile, the climate mild and salubrious, the land in general elevated, solid, and level, refreshed with breezes, and being interspersed with the most beautiful meadows, afford a most delightful



ful prospect. Look up, you see the horizon clear and serene. Look down, you see nature all the year lavishing profusely her sweetest gifts, on the uncultivated plains. Ask those, Sir, who have been in Louisiana, they will give you the most pleasing ideas of the country and climate, we have had such accounts from the French \*, whose

\* Father Gharlevoix remarking "what pleasure it must give to see" the "capital of this immense and beautiful country, increasing insensibly, and "to be able to say with the best grounded hopes that this wild and desert "place, at present almost entirely covered over with canes and trees, one day "become a large and rich colony", says, "these hopes are founded on the "situation of this city on the banks of a navigable river, at the distance "of thirty-three leagues from the sea, from which a vessel may come up "in twenty-four hours; on the fertility of its soil; on the mildness and "wholsomeness of the climate in thirty degrees north latitude; on the "industry of the inhabitants; on its neighbourhood to Mexico, the Havana, the finest islands of America, and lastly to the English colonies." So that from hence it appears what large ideas the French entertain of this country; and that they do not always intend to live in amity with our colonies of Carolina and Georgia. But, to go on with our ghostly father. "Can there be any thing," says he, "more requisite to render a city flourishing? Rome and Paris had not such considerable beginnings, were not "built under such happy auspices, and their founders met not with those "advantages on the Seine and the Tiber, which we have found on the "Mississippi, in comparison of which those two rivers are no more than "brooks." Charlevoix, vol. ii. p. 276.

A little farther, he says (p. 300 and 301) "In a word, I have met with "none who have been on the spot, who have spoken disadvantageously of "Louisiana, but three sorts of persons whose testimony can be of no great "weight: the first, are the sailors, who, from the road at the island of "Dauphiné, have been able to see nothing but that island covered with a "barren sand, and the coast of Bilexi still more sandy, and have suffered "themselves to be persuaded, that the entrance of the Mississippi is impracticable to vessels above a certain bulk; and, that the country is uninhabitable for fifty leagues up the river. They would have been of a very "different opinion, had they had penetration enough to distrust those persons



whose interest it is to conceal its most minute advantages; and that so much, that it has occasioned it to be called, in derision, the Frenchman's paradise.

With regard to the number of inhabitants, that is easily accounted for, and is so plain, that one would think men of sense could not make their objections upon so weak a consideration. It is a prudential maxim among politic nations, and the present general method of establishing colonies, not to extend their settlements, before they have secured a quiet possession. If we consider then, that the French have partly met with the same difficulties, from the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Creek Indians, as the Canadians did from the Five Nations, we shall rather admire at the progress

“ sons who spoke in this manner, and to discover the motives which made  
“ them do so.

“ The second are wretches, who being banished from France, for their  
“ crimes, or ill behaviour, true or supposed; or who, in order to shun the  
“ pursuit of their creditors, listed themselves among the troops, or hired  
“ themselves to the plantations. Both of them looked upon this country as  
“ a place of banishment only, and were consequently shocked with every  
“ thing: they have no tie to bind them, nor any concern for the progress of  
“ a colony of which they are involuntary members, and give themselves  
“ very little trouble about the advantages it is capable of procuring to the  
“ state.

“ The third are such, who having seen nothing but misery in a country,  
“ for which excessive sums have been disbursed, impute to it, without re-  
“ flection, what ought solely to be laid to the incapacity or negligence of  
“ those who were charged with the settling it. They are besides not un-  
“ acquainted with the reasons for publishing that Louisiana contained in its  
“ bosom immense treasures, and thought its value to us was very near equal  
“ to the famous mines of St. Barbe, and others still richer, from which we  
“ flattered ourselves we should be able to drive the possessors with ease; and  
“ because these ridiculous tales found credit with fools, instead of imputing  
“ the mistake to themselves, into which their foolish credulity had engaged  
“ them: they discharged their ill-humour upon this country, in which  
“ they found no one article that had been promised them.”

they



they have already made. Even so lately as in 1729, the French traders and settlers were totally cut off, and massacred; and the Indians infested the banks of the Mississippi so much, that the French thought, a long time after, it would be dangerous to frequent them. For these reasons they have been many years worming themselves in the good graces of these people, finding all their endeavours would prove fruitless, unless they could gain their protection. And, indeed, it must be acknowledged, they have succeeded much better here in this respect than in Canada. Have they not, since the commencement of their establishment, in the space of less than fifty years, conciliated themselves to the natives, and secured the most important passes in the country, at the distance of many hundred miles from their capital? And have they not presumed to unite Canada and Louisiana, though at the distance of between four and five thousand miles from their respective capitals? Can we suppose, the French would have attempted to put in execution this project without a proper foundation for success? Could they have such foundation, if the country was so very barren and unhealthy, or not tolerably peopled? but it is a known fact, that notwithstanding the pretended intemperature of the climate, and the difficulty of getting up the Mississippi to New Orleans, they have already near as many inhabitants in that capital, as they had in the capital of Canada.

Before the French settled themselves in Louisiana, they were contented with moderate bounds in Canada; they had enough of its bitters and sweets to cool them, from extending themselves on that side. From their settlement  
on



on the Mississippi, we may therefore date the commencement of their encroachments in North-America, and their growth of power there. When Carolina was so terribly beset with the Indians in 1715, the French took that opportunity to seize the fort of Albama, one of the most convenient posts in that country to affect our colonies of Carolina, and which had been settled by our traders many years before the French settled on the Mississippi. If such insolence, so very soon after the treaty of Utrecht, and the execution of their scheme for forming a colony on the Mississippi, was left unpunished, could we expect better treatment for the future? If such expectations were entertained, the event has convinced us of their fallacy, for the French, not only still keep possession of this fort, and lay claim to the whole of the River Coussa, because it falls into the River Albama (whereon the fort so called by us is built) but they have since assumed an absolute title to the whole country beyond the Apalachean and Allegany mountains, drawing a line from Cape Escondido in the Gulph of Mexico across the mountains, quite through the heart of the colonies of New York and New England, and up the Bay of Fundy; by which means they leave us only a very contracted skirt along the coast much smaller, even than the tract of land between the mountains and the Mississippi. And, in order to support these pretensions, and their interest with the natives, they have been constantly sending reinforcements and warlike stores; and even at the time of negociating the last peace, they were actually sending, and did, shortly after, send a body of two thousand regulars



lars to Louisiana; and what numbers they have sent since the commencement of the present war, sufficiently appears from the captures we have made of their ships bound to these parts, most of which were freighted with soldiers and warlike stores.

As we have examined Canada on the principle of security, it may be expected, that the same should be done with regard to Louisiana; and, in so doing, Sir, I believe every thing will be found suitable to our desires. Suppose that, upon the entire cession of the latter to us, we restore Canada to the French, and confine them to the west within the River Utawawa and Lake Abitibis, and to the south within Lake Champlain, the proper and legal boundary between the French colonies and ours; or, even suppose we only confine them generally within the Great Lakes, will it not be a barrier infinitely advantageous to us? Will not such a frontier properly protected give us the whole command over the numerous tribes of Indians, and secure us much the greatest share of the fur trade, and from all apprehensions of future encroachments? Can we then entertain the least apprehensions from the French “at Montreal and the “Three Rivers?” Can they “cross Champlain Lake, “and attack Crown-Point\*” without first taking Nut Island, a place whose natural situation gives room to think it may be made one of the strongest fortresses in America? If we kept possession of Nut Island could the French have any vessels on the Lake? Could they transport them over land from the River St. Laurence,

\* Letter to two Great Men.



rather after they had reduced that island, must they not then be obliged to build such vessels? And should we not stand on a much better footing in that respect than the French could? We must have vessels on the Lake previous to the capture of Nut Island; and it must be allowed surely, that we could build as fast as they could. But let us give the author a little farther play. Suppose that the Canadians should have taken Nut Island, taken or destroyed our vessels on the Lake, and likewise the fort at Crown-Point; they must still take Ticonderago, and the pass at the Saw-Mills, before they make incursions into the settled parts of our colonies. We are likewise given to understand, that “if the  
“ River St. Laurence be still theirs, what is to ensure  
“ us against an expedition to Niagara \*?” I would answer almost impossibilities, that is, if we intend to continue the fort there, and garrison it, a matter I can hardly doubt. The French from Canada must still have the same difficulties to encounter, as by the way of  
“ Champlain Lake;” they must overcome a long and very dangerous navigation from Montreal; their vessels must be superior to ours; and they must likewise reduce Frontenac, Oswego, and Toronto, before they took Niagara: for what good effect could they reap from the capture of that place; and how could they keep possession of it, when in the heart of the country of the Indians our allies, and while we had such important places still in our hands? And even be they as expeditious and successful as you please, they cannot make such conquests within two years at least. The taking of Niagara, and Ticonderago also, cost us three years,

\* Letter, &c. p. 30,

though



tho' under our very noses, and when we had not near so many difficulties to encounter as the French will have. And, during all this time, I should be glad to know what we should be doing; I have considered the opposition no more than could be expected in profound peace, from the garrisons of those places alone: but would not the Indians our allies, or the forces raised by the colonies, be able to stop the enemies progress, to repel them, and carry the war into the very heart of Canada without any assistance from the mother country? Is there likewise the least prospect of the French getting possession of the Lakes? How could they come near Detroit and Missilimakinac, more especially with a force to attack them? Could they get to them any otherwise than by navigating Lake Ontario, and from thence into Lake Erie, after taking those forts I have before mentioned? and, even after this is done, would not the two forts at Detroit and Missilimakinac, be sufficiently protected by our people from Louisiana?

Thus I think, Sir, I have fully answered the gentleman's question with respect to an invasion from Canada; and therefore the consequences he draws from that opinion must cease. I own, if we make this barrier in North-America, I am "so weak to believe that they will lay aside" their "plan of usurpation." I dare say they will not think of "elbowing all our colonies round about; I dare say they will not think "of resuming the same ambitious views of enlargement, which the most sacred ties of former treaties could not restrain\*." I have these essential reasons for believing

\* Letter, &c. p. 30.



and thinking so. When the French first possessed themselves of these forts, and indeed of all their encroachments, they did not do it by violence; we were so unacquainted with the Lakes (otherwise than by hearsay and vague reports) and looked with so much contempt on the French power in Canada, and so little consulted the friendship of the Indians, that we had not the least apprehensions of any bad consequences arising from a neglect of either. But our ideas are now quite changed; we have experienced the danger of the designs of France, and the necessity of keeping on good terms with the Indians, and we have forts to protect ourselves and them, on the very utmost limits of our frontier, the least attempt on which must be by open violence and hostility.

Now I am upon this subject, give me leave, Sir, to recommend something to attain our ends in North-America more effectually for the future. For this purpose, two different regulations are required; the one regarding our conduct to the Indians, and the other our measures with the French. There is no occasion to have recourse to extirpate the Indians; treat them only with more humanity, and we shall find them easy of reconciliation and alliance. But, if we again suffer the French to have any intercourse with them, we may always expect to have broils and dissensions. The forts on our frontier will effectually hinder this, if they are not suffered to resort to them upon the principle of trade. Let us remind them if they should request this, that it was upon the same pretence they formed their forts of Frontenac, Niagara, and the passes at the other lakes. With regard to the other regulation, all kind of commerce between our colonies and the Canadians ought



ought to be carefully prevented. Our own people have hitherto enabled the French to undermine them in the Indian trade, which they chiefly carried on with English commodities. Stroud's duffils, and others of our woollen manufactures were much better and cheaper in our colonies than those that could be had in Canada of French manufacture (which, by the bye, are chiefly made with our own wool.) Our rum, another prime article of the Indian trade was likewise to be had much cheaper than French brandy. By making such a provision for the security of our colonies, and a perseverance in measures to prevent any intercourse with Canada, our colonies will enjoy all the blessings of peace and tranquillity, will be relieved from all apprehensions of rivalry in trade or power, and Canada will be rendered worse than nothing to the French, it will prove a burden to them.

But there is another object still remains worthy of our regard, the fishery. If we insist on the cession of Cape-Breton and its dependent isles at the mouth of the River St. Laurence; if we have likewise our right to the coasts of Nova Scotia confirmed, would not these articles alone prove of great detriment to the French fishery. But, as this branch of trade has chiefly enabled them to support their marine, I think no restriction or duty whatever can compensate for a privilege of resorting to it; and, to shew you, Sir, that I do not think "the refusal of this privilege\*" would be "so very unreasonable" I shall have need only to refer to the accounts of the extent of that trade, as carried on by France. According to a computation made of this branch of the French trade the year before

\* Letter to Two Great Men, p. 32.



this war (1755) it appeared that the quantity of the fish imported by the French ships, was 1,149,000 quintals of dry fish, and 3,900,000 mudfish ; the value of both which, including 3,116 and a quarter ton of train oil drawn from the blubber, amounted to 926,577..10, according to the prime cost of the fish at Newfoundland ; which, with the addition of the freight to the several markets where it was sold made 949,192,10 l. sterling : and add to this the consumption of woollen manufactures and brandy, and naval stores made it at least a million of money per annum. And this trade employed no less than 564 ships, besides shallops, and 27,500 seamen. Now, if we lament the growth of French power, as the cause of those wars that hath depopulated Europe for this century past ; and are convinced that our own liberties and independency are founded on the superiority of our naval power over that of France, would it not, when we see in how great a measure this privilege has contributed, and in how great a measure the continuance of it is likely to contribute to the French power, so far from being “ unreasonable,” be unpardonable ; and the more so, if we consider the nature of the French claim, a matter I shall hereafter attend to ? If they have the least share of it, will they not be always encroaching upon pretence of building huts to refresh their men ? Will they not be always encroaching on us upon pretence of building stages, and curing their fish ; revoke therefore the privileges granted them on the coast of Newfoundland ? But, as the French likewise carried on a great trade with mud fish, which were not under a necessity of being cured and dried, make it a pain of confiscation both of ship and freight, if any of those fish are found on board ; and, in order to  
render



render such a law strictly observed and efficacious, let the captors enjoy the benefit of such prizes, whether private trading ships, or of the royal navy: *fas est et ab hoste doceri*; this practice is taught us by the French, it is the preservative of their trade to the Sugar Islands. If it should be enquired how the Canadians are to support themselves, as the fish made no small part of their food; I would answer, that the River St. Laurence, from the island of Anticosti to Montreal, will give them enough for themselves without resorting to Cape Breton, and the banks of Newfoundland. And to shew you, Sir, how impossible it will be, if Cape Breton, and St. John's, as well as Canada, are restored to France; for the subjects of that crown, ever to avoid encroachments on us, give me leave to recollect the utility of the former of those islands to France in that respect. When they had possession of Cape Breton and the north-east part of Nova Scotia, their store-ships and men of war generally resorted to the harbour of Louisbourg, from whence they took the opportunity of going to Quebec at their pleasure. In a time of danger from an enemy, they often unloaded at Cape Breton, and when the season was so far advanced as to oblige our fleets to leave the blockade of Cape Breton, and return to port, they sent two or three ships, with the stores to Quebec, in which case they were obliged to winter there. But, if this was not practicable (as was often the case) on account of the advanced season, they transported them in winter over the ice to the coast of Nova Scotia, and by that means conveyed them to Canada by land. From hence it is evident, what great reason we have to apprehend, that if France is suffered to repossess Cape Breton, they would likewise endea-

your



your to repossess their former settlement in the bays of  
 Gaspey, Chaleur, and Mirimichi, would they not  
 greatly strengthen those places? Would they not carry  
 fire and sword into the heart of Nova Scotia, and soon  
 make us repent of a step, which we cannot, at this  
 time but think would be highly detrimental to us? But,  
 would not the retention of Cape Breton on the other  
 hand effectually prevent this? Would it not of course  
 render it extremely difficult for France to support Ca-  
 nada in a future war? The harbour of Quebec is very  
 improper and unsafe for the reception of large ships on  
 account of the violent storms that are very frequent in the  
 River St. Laurence, and often drive ships in the harbour  
 on shore: and do not these storms often prove fatal to  
 many ships, in navigating the river to and from Que-  
 bec, by reason of the many dangerous rocks and shoals,  
 which even in calms, it is often impossible to avoid, be-  
 cause of the fogginess of the air? In case a fleet from  
 France should escape the vigilance of our fleets in the  
 Bay of Biscay, should enter the Gulph of St. Laurence  
 before our fleet from Halifax was collected to intercept  
 them, would they not find it very difficult, if not im-  
 possible, to return from thence without hazarding an  
 engagement which might prove fatal to their affairs?  
 Should we not likewise have every advantage over them  
 from our inland frontier, which, by the connection with  
 the land belonging to the Hudson's Bay company, would  
 entirely surround all Canada, and from every part where-  
 of we might, upon any future rupture, make incursions  
 into the very heart of Canada in different parts, particu-  
 larly by the Lakes Champlain and Ontario? Let <sup>us</sup> ~~us~~  
 consider, Sir, the situation of these lakes, and their  
 proximity to the most principal settlements in Canada:  
 let



let us consider our own colonies, protected by forts at the most convenient passes; their frontier to the west secured by the forts of Detroit and Missilimakinac, and to the south by Niagara, Oswego, Toronto, and Frontenac on Lake Ontario, and by Ticonderago, Crown Point, and Nut Island on Lake Champlain; forts which might be made almost impregnable to any force from Canada, at a very moderate expence, and upon their present plans; let us, Sir, maturely consider these advantages, and we may say, with good reason, that we can at any time oblige the French to preserve peace. And therefore, Sir, I cannot but think with the Remarker, that “our claims before the war were large enough for possession and for security too\*”; and these, Sir, are claims we can “rightfully make†”; and such as will give us the most desirable security, without being incumbered with the cold, barren, uncomfortable, and uninviting country of Canada.

Give me leave, Sir, to interest you a little farther on this matter. We have, for a long time, looked with an invidious eye on the Spanish settlement at Cape Florida, which we thought endangered our colonies of Georgia and Carolina; and the invasion of the former from thence confirmed this opinion. We thought likewise a conquest of it would give us greater advantage over their trade; we therefore returned the salutation, by an attack on St. Augustine, but were necessitated to abandon the enterprize, with the loss of many lives. Whence then this forgetfulness, this partial influence of caprice! a regard for a present occasion has been too much the defect of former treaties; let our considera-

\* Remark. p. 19.

† Interest of Great Britain, &c. p. 45.



tion for the future succeed in the ensuing. The last war seemed to have opened our eyes, we thought we could then discover whence France and Spain might hurt us most, and where we might have the same advantage over them: but now, when the opportunity offers, we seem to have forgot the being and nature of such conceptions. Louisiana does not want attractiveness, it is the only object that can secure us in North-America; it is much more worthy our commercial views than Canada, the commodities of which are the same as in our northern colonies, and cannot be of any particular benefit, when we have already such plenty of them; and that, without retaining Canada, we should, merely by clipping it of its encroachments, enjoy more than half its profits. But, with regard to the produce of Louisiana, should we not preserve to ourselves a monopoly of tobacco, for which the soil and climate is every way fit, and which there is the greatest reason to believe the French would engross to themselves as they had done the sugar trade, if they were suffered to possess a country so convenient for such a valuable commodity? Should we not likewise rear great quantities of indigo and cotton, articles much wanted in our manufactures, and which we have been often obliged to purchase of those very enemies with whom we are now at war, and whose chief system was to overturn our constitutions? and even in those marshy parts adjoining to the Gulph of Mexico is not the land fit for most kinds of vegetables and nutriment for men and cattle? May not the inhabitants raise more than enough to supply their own demands, and also a share for the Leeward Islands, a trade for which it is conveniently situated; for, tho' they can't  
take



take a direct course to them by reason of the strong current, they may fall through the Gulph of Florida into the Atlantic Ocean, and have a shorter passage than from any other of our colonies? The establishment of a little manufactory has been attempted in Georgia, would it not be as practicable in Louisiana? Do not the climate and great number of mulberry-trees that grow so plentifully there, afford a most pleasing prospect of bringing that scheme to perfection? might not tea likewise be produced, when nearly in the same latitude as Pekin in China, and the seasons are not very different? the produce of this commodity from our own colonies, would be a real benefit to the nation, as it would not only bring great profits to the revenue, but likewise preserve that specie in the kingdom which we so much lament the loss of by this trade to the East-Indies. The inland country is remarkable for an abundance of the best timbers, no doubt more fit for navigation in hot climates, than those from our northern colonies, which are apt to split: while, on the other hand, those from hot climates maintain their firmness, and are proof against those destructive vermin, called wood ants, that make such havock in the bottoms of ships made of timber from a hot climate. Must not the timber of Louisiana be likewise more fit for the use of the sugar planters, who have such a large demand for them for carriages, sugar mills, &c. and which they have hitherto been supplied with by the Dutch, at a great distance and great price, from Barbituis and Esquebe? Is it not more than probable, that the logwood of Honduras (which has caused such a long dispute between us and the Spaniards) if transplanted here, would enable us to supply



ourselves with that valuable commodity of our own growth? they thrive in a marshy soil, therefore there is the greatest reason to think they would on the coasts of Louisiana. Might not the cochineal be also produced there, when the *Opuntia* grow in such abundance in Mexico, and bring an annual income into Spain of near a million of money? As there are such great quantities of wild vines there, might not wine be produced? This would be another great saving to the nation as they might answer as well as those which we buy of our enemies. In a word, might not every commodity within or near the Tropics, thrive in Louisiana? But what, Sir, would greatly add to the value of this settlement to England, would be its proximity to the Spanish subjects of Mexico. No doubt our manufactures, notwithstanding the strongest prohibition, would find a vent there with the same facility as those of France do by the way of St. Domingo. The possession of Louisiana would likewise give us an infinite advantage over St. Augustine, and a greater advantage over the flotas from Vera Cruz than Jamaica has over the galleons from Carthagena. In going to the Havanna from Vera Cruz, the ships are obliged to cross the Gulph of Mexico, and the currents being very strong from the north sea against the coasts of Louisiana and Florida, and thro' the Gulph of Florida, the ships from Vera Cruz are often drove on those coasts: and the Gulph of Florida being the passage homeward bound from the Leeward and Windward Islands, and the neighbouring continent, the possession of Louisiana would therefore prove of the greatest benefit to our cruizers and privateers. We should thereby be much better enabled to reduce Cuba and St. Augustine; our

trade



trade would become greatly extended in those valuable parts, and in future times might we not succeed by an invasion in the Bay of Campeachy? the capture of Vera Cruz would cut off the communication between Spanish, North, and South America, and enable us to get possession of the mines of Mexico.

And this sole possession of the Mississippi, would be the more beneficial to us, Sir, as we should thereby have the whole country beyond the mountains at our own disposal and pleasure. Settlers would resort there because they could be under no apprehensions from an enemy; and, because the many difficulties of a land carriage, from thence to the Atlantic Ocean would be removed, as they might send their commodities all the way by water to New Orleans, by means of the many large and navigable rivers, that communicate with the Mississippi. Settlers would resort there, because they might be in hopes to extend themselves within the neighbourhood of the Spanish subjects of New Mexico. And, in short, Sir, by this possession of Louisiana, England would be effectually relieved from an apprehension of the independence of her colonies from their great populousness, and the spirit of manufacturing among them, occasioned by the want of possessions for the inhabitants to extend themselves, and a sufficient quantity of land to keep them employed in agriculture.

These, Sir, are reasons why I think Louisiana an object every way so desirable, and, in short, the advantages we shall reap from this acquisition, bid so fair that without it (whether we conquer it or not) we shall have, I will not say, “a treacherous,” but “a delusive peace.” We need not therefore be told with so much



much vehemence by a late popular author \*, that an “ expedition to the Mississippi ” would be so very “ useless ” as he seems to imagine.

I am sensible, Sir, it would be a work of infinite difficulty to persuade the French to cede all their possessions on this continent. I believe, it is not the proposed design of the war, and I would by no means urge such a notion ; not only because I think it would not be altogether agreeable to good policy ; but particularly, because I would desire no more in North-America than was consistent with security, as it would not only seem unreasonable, but be unnecessary, as we can have the most desirable security, without demanding Canada, and as such demand must of course greatly lessen our demands where I think, they are more immediately wanted. Let the French have Canada then, under such restrictions as I have premised, only by clipping them of Louisiana and their other encroachments, and you will reduce it to the state it was in at the treaty of Utrecht ; leave the French Canada, and *we* shall find them more desirous of cultivating the arts of peace than those of war ; and *they* will find it more desirable, and to their interest to live in amity with their neighbours, nay, in some awe of them, an end that can be attained by no other means than thus securing ourselves, and subjecting their commerce and marine to the superiority of our own. This, Sir, being a chief cause of my present address, is an object, I flatter myself, I have hitherto attended to ; it is an object I shall, in the ensuing sheets, ever strive principally to keep in view.

\* Considerations on the German war, p. 130.

Having



Having, I think Sir, sufficiently enlarged on the proper barrier to be insisted on in North America, I shall next proceed to consider the other part of my argument, the reasonableness and necessity of retaining the French Sugar Islands.

It must be admitted, Sir, that the pretence of our having sugar land enough, is false; for, without considering the nature of the soil in our own islands, and the great detriment done to the land by continued culture, can we suppose, that if our sugar planters could supply Ireland and North America with the produce of their own plantations, that they would pay the traders from thence in specie, or bills of exchange for their commodities of lumber and provision? And, that they do this, I find by an estimate, extracted from the entries in the public offices of Jamaica, not long before the commencement of this war, computed upon an average of three years; whereby it appeared, that the annual imports, from North America to that island alone, were ninety-four thousand two hundred pounds, and the exports from thence twenty-two thousand, two hundred and twenty-two pounds ten shillings. The northern colonies, therefore, received a ballance of sixty-four thousand, nine hundred and seventy-seven pounds, ten shillings in money or bills of exchange; and even scarce a third part of the value of those exports was in the article of sugar. I make no doubt, but that the balance has been in like proportion from the Leeward Islands. Besides, Sir, it must be morally impossible, if our colonies do not produce more than seventy thousand hogheads of sugar annually, according to the largest calculations, and Great Britain alone consumes every year six  
parts



parts out of the seven, that there can be any quantity of sugar exported to the North American colonies and Ireland. A late author, speaking of the demand of sugar in the latter, tells us, that “ it may be reasonably imagined, that the French have, in a great measure, supplied the people of Ireland with sugars, for the annual consumption of sugar in Ireland above thirty years ago, is valued by Mr. Dobbs at more than sixty thousand pounds; and, as the consumption of tea is greatly increased since that time, the consumption of sugar hath undoubtedly kept pace with it\*.” It is true, that the exports of sugar from our plantations have not been so great as might have been expected; but then there is something to be made in answer to it, without laying so much weight upon a supposed combination among our sugar planters: for “ the great consumption of rum in this kingdom put the British sugar planters upon distilling such great quantities of melasses, as not to leave a sufficiency thereof to supply the demands of the North American colonies; and this obliged the sugar planters to pay money for a considerable proportion of the provisions, lumber, &c. wherewith they were supplied from New England and other northern colonies†.” The northern traders, and those from Ireland not finding their market among our own planters, were therefore induced to get sugar elsewhere, and this they did from the French, who sometimes received the value of that commodity in lumber, provisions, &c. and at other times in money, or bills of exchange; both which were very accep-

\* State of the British sugar colony trade, by Massie, p. 16.

† State of the sugar trade, p. 13.



table to the French planters. So that “ the balance  
 “ which the sugar planters from time to time ” re-  
 “ ceived on the trade with England ” was “ the  
 “ fund by which ” the northern traders paid “ for  
 “ all the commodities elsewhere bought from the  
 “ French with money ; and the specie which ” they  
 “ received “ for provisions, lumber, &c. sold in the  
 “ British sugar colonies, and all the French sugars,  
 “ manufactures, &c. fraudulently imported there ” were  
 “ paid for out of the money received from this nation.  
 “ None of those vast losses ” did “ in the least affect  
 “ the British sugar planters, excepting in particular cases ;  
 “ for the British wealth, which they ” dissipated “ by  
 “ those several means ” was “ constantly replaced by  
 “ other wealth, received from their mother country \*.  
 The sugar planters thinking themselves injured by  
 these dealings of the North American colonies, lament-  
 ed the loss of their money, as taken from their own  
 pockets, and carried to the French, with many bitter  
 reflections and acrimony. The northern traders recri-  
 minated in their turns, and hence ensued that great  
 quarrel between them, which answered no other end  
 than exposing themselves, and opening the eyes of  
 others in their mother country, who could not hope  
 to see any remedy being put to it. The sugar plan-  
 ters exposed the underhand trade carried on by the  
 northern traders ; and the northern traders as bitter-  
 ly inveighed against the combinations and exorbitant  
 demands of the planters, which occasioned them, as

\* State of sugar trade, p. 14.



they said, to go to a foreign market. These dissensions still subsist; the time is favourable for putting an end to them, and to form that equilibrium, which is necessary to render both dependent on their mother country. The cause of complaint arises from the disproportion of our sugar colonies to those of the northern colonies, the latter entirely subsisting upon the former, which is their only market, and can alone enable them to pay for the manufactures of Great Britain. Agriculture and farming are the employments and livelihood of our northern colonies: if therefore they can't find a vent for their commodities among our own people, they must do it elsewhere: and, if they cannot do that, they must apply themselves to some other occupation. For instance, if the North American farmer cannot find a vent for his grain, provisions, horses, &c. can he supply himself with the necessary utensils for his business, and the conveniences of life? he may indeed feed his family, but he can't cloath them: and, if his commodities are such, that they cannot procure vent at a foreign market, he must set up manufacturing: and, if this should take effect among our North American colonies, will it not render them independent of England? We are indeed told, and with a great deal of seeming warmth, that “no man  
 “who can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient  
 “by his labour to subsist his family in plenty, is poor  
 “enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a mas-  
 “ter\*.” But this doctrine is subject to many excep-  
 tions. If a man has “a piece of land of his own” the subsistence of “his family in plenty” depends on

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 18.



the fertility of that land, and not only the quantity, but the quality of the produce. He may also have more than “ sufficient to subsist his family in plenty” with the produce, but then he may not have enough to procure them the other conveniences of life. Not only this, but a plenty of the same commodity, generally renders the sale very precarious ; and, if sold, the profits are often so small, as scarce to defray the charges of sustenance, and the necessary instruments of husbandry. Great plenty and industry are therefore incompatible ; and some new method of working to a greater advantage, will always follow.

Besides, if “ the natural livelihood of the greatest “ population of a country is manufactures \* ”, is it not a strong reason to fear the northern colonies ; for they are by much the more populous of any in North America, considering the extent of their settlements ? And even in answer to the single article mentioned by the Remarker of the manufacture of “ hats,” we are only told, that “ the beaver skins are not now to be had in “ New England, but from very remote places, and at “ great prices† ;” so that, even upon that consideration, the manufacture of hats is not rejected out of good-will, but their incapacity of supplying themselves with the beaver-skins as cheap as from England. But be the *places* ever so *remote*, and the *prices* ever so *great*, the New-Englanders can certainly have them as cheap as we in *Old* England.

Give me leave, Sir, to lay before you what an ingenious gentleman lately said on the state of our northern

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 40.



colonies. “ These colonies,” says he, “ having plenty  
 “ of provisions amongst themselves, and even a large  
 “ quantity for exportation, they take nothing of this  
 “ nature, but some Irish beef, butter, and pork ; and  
 “ these they will not want long ; and those colonies  
 “ having interfered with Great Britain in the corn trade  
 “ to several of her foreign markets, Great Britain and  
 “ Ireland can expect to receive no great benefit from the  
 “ plantations in those articles. We have hitherto fur-  
 “ nished them with a great quantity of their materials  
 “ for wearing apparel, household furniture, silk, woollen,  
 “ and linen manufactures ; but, if they should establish  
 “ the linnen and woollen manufactures amongst them-  
 “ selves, and encourage every other species of arti-  
 “ ficers to settle amongst them, our plantations may, at  
 “ length, prove detrimental, instead of beneficial to  
 “ the three kingdoms.

“ If it should be deemed good policy in Great Bri-  
 “ tain to suffer her northern colonies to supply them-  
 “ selves with all wearables, and all furniture, as well  
 “ as all kinds of provisions ; may not this prove a pre-  
 “ paratory step towards their becoming capable of sup-  
 “ plying other nations herewith, unless they are kept  
 “ under such proper restrictions, as may prevent those  
 “ injuries to their mother country, as well as to Scot-  
 “ land and Ireland.

“ The primary establishment of these colonies was  
 “ intended principally for the business of planting, not  
 “ for that of manufacturing. However wise and ne-  
 “ cessary it may be to indulge them in some degree in the  
 “ latter ; yet the natural consequence thereof, should  
 “ be effectually guarded against for the benefit of the  
 “ whole



“ whole nation; for we well know, that the habit of  
 “ manufacturing in a few capital articles will beget  
 “ that in more; handicraftsmen in one branch of ma-  
 “ nufactural and mechanical business beget others; and,  
 “ as the necessaries of life, and the price of labour are  
 “ likely to grow cheaper and cheaper amongst them,  
 “ should we not keep a strict eye, that the infant is not  
 “ reared in a way to prove detrimental; and, at length,  
 “ ruinous to the interest of her parent? While these  
 “ colonies shall not be capable of manufacturing so  
 “ cheap as Great Britain and Ireland, it will remain  
 “ their interest rather to take what they have been  
 “ wont to do of them: but, so soon as they shall be  
 “ able to furnish themselves equally cheap, we must  
 “ expect to lose all that exportation: and, if they are  
 “ permitted to go those lengths, it is easy to judge what  
 “ farther strides they will attempt to go, unless they  
 “ are duly restrained in their career of manufacturing  
 “ by the wisdom of the British legislature\*.”

From hence, Sir, it is evident, that an imputation  
 of the spirit of manufacturing among our northern co-  
 lonies is no new topic, it is in fact what has engaged the  
 concern of not a small part of this nation. But it is a  
 lamentable misfortune in politics as well as in religion,  
 that there are those who have eyes, but see not, and those  
 who have ears but hear not, and who never have any  
 feeling, but when calamities become realized, and it is  
 too late to provide against them. Ought we not, Sir,  
 at least to endeavour to prevent these threatening symp-  
 toms? Ought we not to cherish every scheme that  
 tends to the welfare of our colonies, and that will ren-

\* Great Britain's Commercial Interest explained and improved, by Postle-  
 thwaite, vol. ii. p. 148, 149, and 150.



der them more beneficial to their mother country, than they have been, or are at present, likely to be hereafter? do not all the apprehensions of this spirit of manufacturing among our northern colonies arise from the disproportion between them, and the sugar islands? and do not all the evils that result from this disproportion fall on the mother country? For we not only lose the great balance we pay to the Sugar Islands to the yearly amount of many score thousand pounds, which is most of it carried to our enemies, but we likewise lose the benefit we might otherwise receive from the northern colonies. In justice therefore to candour and truth, it must be own'd, that the advocates for retaining the French Sugar Islands, have this superiority over their adversaries, and the bigots to Canada. The interest of our Sugar Islands is inseparably annexed to their mother country; they reciprocally depend on each other: and even our own North American colonies, in a great measure depend on the Sugar Islands; it is they that take off their lumber, corn, and provisions, their staple commodities, which would otherwise become useless to them, or detrimental to their mother country, by interfering with her in those commodities to the European market.

It is true, the possession of the Neutral Islands of Tobago, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, would, in a great measure, obviate the cause of the losses, occasioned by the want of a sufficient quantity of sugar; but then we should not diminish the trade of France; and should receive very little addition to our own by a share of that trade to Europe, we could never carry the sugar to a foreign market: that branch would still remain wholly in the hands of France. For,



as long as France has more than sufficient for her home consumption, she can always under-sell us at a foreign market, allowing only for the advantages she has in the smallness of the duty on plantation produce ; but considering the other natural advantages that France has over us, in the number of inhabitants, she could do it from that cause alone, because the price of labour must be of course so much the cheaper. Do not the French buy beef and mutton, and other provisions, for half the price we pay for them here ? Is not their inland carriage near sixty per cent. cheaper than in England ? Do they not sell their cloth manufactures twenty-five pounds per cent. cheaper than our traders ? And is not their seamen's wages lower by one half than that of ours ? The only method therefore to bring that trade into our hands, is by retaining Martinico and Guadalupe, as well as the Neutral Islands ; and then France will have little, if any more than sufficient for her home consumption. It is, Sir, the only method whereby we can retain a share of the commerce of Europe in that commodity, and procure a larger demand for our manufactures among our northern colonies : it is, Sir, the only method that can relieve us from all apprehensions of the independency of those colonies on their mother country : and these, Sir, are advantages that will be purchased at the expence of France, our more than mortal enemy.

But, not to confine ourselves, Sir, merely to the injury the loss of such a valuable branch of trade would prove to France, and benefit to ourselves, it may be easily foreseen what injury our own islands and trading ships



ships might receive from the French keeping possession of Martinico and Guadalupe, or even either of them; supposing the French should, upon that condition, give up their pretensions to the Neutral Islands, and should suffer us to acquire a full possession of them. Could our colonies even then enjoy the prospect of security? Could they be relieved from apprehensions of an attack? or, would our trading ships be a whit the less exposed to the privateers of the enemy? Till these ends are attained, the Sugar Islands cannot be deemed secure, till these ends are attended, Britons cannot say their interests have been properly attended to; they cannot say that the M——r has availed himself and his country “ of a successful war, in the attainment of an advantageous peace.” Only consider, Sir, our islands of Tabago, Barbadoes. St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christophers, &c. islands that seem to convey large ideas of their extent and produce, tho’ inferior in both to Martinico and Guadalupe; only consider, Sir, the French possessed of those two large islands, more strong, convenient, and important in every respect than our own, and situated in the very center of them, and you cannot, Sir, but comply with me in an opinion, that the security I am so strenuous for, is no unworthy object of your consideration: and the more so as the ships from Europe bound to the Leeward and Windward Islands, the Caraccas, Carthagená, New-Spain, and the whole coast of the Gulph of Mexico, strike Descada first, a small French island within sight of Guadalupe, and at no great distance from Martinico. If the French should  
formally



formally and fully cede to us the Neutral Islands, upon condition of being suffered to enjoy Martinico and Guadalupe, must we not expect that they will endeavour to supply that loss, by making themselves more powerful in those islands? Would not those islands receive a great addition of inhabitants by the removal of those from the settlements they have already formed in the Neutral Islands? Would not France, by being thus confined to Martinico and Guadalupe, make them more strong and formidable in the number of white inhabitants, fortifications and soldiers? And this additional strength is the more to be apprehended from those islands, whose natural advantages of situation are such as to require very little assistance from art to make them more so.

And, in a word, would not France, by being possessed of these two islands alone, be in every respect more formidable to us among the Leeward Islands, than when she was possessed of the Neutral Islands? Would not our trade, by the possession of the latter be consequently more exposed to the enemy? Would not England always be obliged to keep two separate fleets on the Leeward Island station, each of them strong enough to encounter a fleet of France? I say, Sir, would not England be obliged to do this; I appeal to you, Sir, I appeal, to the gentlemen of the navy, who must know something of the situation of those islands, and the winds and currents in those seas? And these natural disadvantages are the more to be feared, when we recollect, that several of our transports, in their passage only from Basseterre in Guadalupe to Fort Louis in Grandterre, were, from the great difficulty of turning to windward, full three weeks be-



fore they got to that place. English harbour in Antigua (the best port we were possessed of in that part of the world for the reception and security of large ships) was the general rendezvous of the British fleet on that station, and thereby gave protection to Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christophers, and the lesser islands to the westward of them, which having no harbour for the reception of a fleet, would otherwise have been too much exposed to the enemy from Martinico and Guadalupe who might frequently have sailed to either of them within a few hours. Now, Sir, would not the same reason induce us to keep another fleet in the port of *le petite carcenage* in St. Lucia, a port one of the best, and that might be made one of the most secure and formidable of any in America? Would not this, Sir, be highly necessary for the protection of that island, which is almost within sight of Martinico? Would it not, Sir, be highly necessary for the protection of St. Vincent, Tabago, and Barbadoes, which have no convenient port for the reception of a fleet, and would be consequently in the greatest danger from an enemy? The fate of these last islands must therefore depend on the fate of St. Lucia, in the same manner as Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christopher's, and the lesser islands to the westward of them depend on Antigua.

It is evident therefore, that the danger of all the Sugar Islands, falling into the hands of France, though we should become fully possessed of the Neutral Islands, is far from being impossible, and so distant as some may imagine, as it entirely depends on fortuitous events. If St. Lucia was lost, or its best harbour ruined, could  
we



we maintain ourselves in St. Vincent and Tabago? And, if the same should happen to Antigua, would it not greatly endanger Dominica, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christopher's, &c. for, by losing that protection they had from the fleet at Antigua, and there being no convenient port in the neighbourhood, and such as would answer the purpose of English Harbour in Antigua, what could hinder the French from attacking those islands, and reducing them? Or to put the most moderate construction on this circumstance, how could we hinder the French from intercepting all our navigation to and from Europe to those islands? And, that we cannot hope to put a stop to the great damages done our trade by the privateers of the French, otherwise than by an entire conquest of *all* their possessions, we have too wofully experienced. And, if we cannot do it now, while the French power has suffered such a check in the reduction of Guadalupe, when their fleets have been destroyed, when the few ships they have left dare not come out of port to their assistance; and, when we have in those seas, a fleet of upwards of twenty ships, and great part of them of the line, to block up Martinico, what can we expect hereafter? Could our merchant ships pass without a convoy superior to the fleet of France on that station? And, could any trade bear the immense expence of such convoys? If we had not two large separate fleets on this station, at St. Lucia and Antigua, our fleets must of course rendezvous at one of them; and, in that case, might not the French attack the other; and, after intelligence should be received of such attack by our fleet, and the ships were collected and ready to sail, might not the winds prove



so unfavourable as to prevent their timely arrival to give the necessary assistance; more especially if the fleet was at Antigua, and the attack made on St. Lucia? And, to conceive, Sir, what we have to apprehend from such an attack, only consider the different establishment of the French in those islands from that of our own; it will naturally lead you into stronger reflections on the danger we are exposed to from that quarter, than any thing I can say on the subject. In 1676, the number of White Men in Barbadoes alone was computed to be twenty thousand (besides women and children) and eighty thousand negroes; but mark the revolution within these late years; in 1724 the number of White Men in that island, able to bear arms, was only four thousand eight hundred and twelve, according to the representation from the board of trade; and about the year 1740, the number of Negroes there was usually sixty thousand, which may serve to give us some idea of the number of Whites then there. In 1701, the French island colonies of Martinico, Guadelupe, St. Domingo, Cayenne, Grenade, Marigalante, &c. contained eight thousand eight hundred and fifty White Men, and forty-five thousand six hundred Blacks, according to the representation of the French council of commerce; but, by a calculation made in 1751, the French then had, in the said colonies, upwards of fifty-one thousand and five hundred White Men fit to bear arms, independent of many thousands of sailors employed in the trade of the colonies, and three hundred sixty-four thousand and eight hundred slaves of both sexes: and the general computation within these



these late years has been, that the French have *one* White Man to every three Negroes ; whereas the English have only one White Man to *twenty* Negroes ; an assertion no less amazing than true ! A British M——r, Sir, ought to keep a watchful eye on these dangerous symptoms ; he ought to consider of what great utility this branch of trade is to France, and what it would hereafter prove to Great Britain ; he ought to consider what danger there is to be apprehended of the loss of the most important of our islands ; and to put the least consideration on the matter, how likely our whole trade is to become in their power. And, that we cannot put a stop to this evil, I have already shewn ; nay, we cannot even expect to prevent their fleets getting in and out of a single port in Martinico alone, as they have done whenever they please, and they have it always in their power to avoid an engagement : for, to use C——re M——re's own words, “ from the almost constant lee currents, “ it being very difficult for ships to get to windward, it “ must be always in the enemy's choice, whether they “ will come to a general action or not.” From hence, Sir, we may conclude to what little effect it would be to keep fleets on that station, while the French have *either* Martinico or Guadalupe ; such fleets will only prove an unnecessary expence to the nation ; unnecessary because they must be employed in fruitless cruizes against the enemy ; and unnecessary, because they must hear of, and often see our trading ships carried into a French port without being able to prevent it.

Whoever will look into the several lists of captures made by privateers from Martinico, and carried in there since the reduction of Guadalupe, will find to  
what



what excessive losses we are liable from the capture of ships by that single island: they will even find that, instead of being benefited by such a considerable acquisition as Guadalupe, our trade has in effect suffered by it. I would not be misunderstood in this; I do not mean to insinuate the least prejudice against the retention of Guadalupe, that island alone would certainly be a great loss to the enemy, and of much importance to us, both as an addition to our sugar trade in times of peace, and security to that trade in time of war: but the reason we have not experienced the latter, has been owing to the injudicious terms granted to that island on its surrender, whether from design or inadvertency, I will not pretend to determine. By the capitulation, the men belonging to privateers, and all others who had no property in the island, were at liberty to retire to Martinico: and, with regard to those that acted in a military capacity, and in defence of the island, whether belonging to Guadalupe, Marigalante, or Martinico, it was particularly insisted on that they should be sent to the latter *only*, and should carry with them their arms, baggage, servants, &c. But, as the mention of this so frequently occurs in the articles, I am inclined to think it was intentional; and that for the following reasons. The intercourse between Martinico and France had met with such interruption, that the French gave over all thoughts of carrying on their commerce in their own bottoms, and their Dutch carriers meeting with the like obstruction, the inhabitants of Martinico had long found it difficult to supply themselves with a sufficiency of provisions. This was the general opinion among the people in our own islands; to which some added,



added, that they had already maintained themselves a long time by the mere capture of our store-ships. The intention therefore of confining such an additional number of inhabitants to the single island of Martinico, which could not supply the demands of its own proper inhabitants, must have been to starve it to a surrender. But the event has proved the absurdity of this scheme. By the great increase of sailors and landmen, their privateers have increased in proportion; and those being small and full of men, have made great havock among our trading ships, notwithstanding the much boasted strength of our fleet. Indeed it must be acknowledg'd, they have had but too much reason to be merry at fighting us with our own weapons! I should be sorry to infer the least reflection on the late Com——re on that station, my intention is not to calumniate our officers, nor cavil with them about the nature of their duty: this, perhaps, has been an abuse already too much lavished on the subject. We know what papers have been distributed among our islands of the most injurious contents\*, and how freely those islanders have expressed

\* The following, (copies of which were stuck up on all the tavern doors in a certain island, the first night after the arrival of a late C——re on that station; a successful attempt on the enemy) may serve to convey some ideas of the respect paid to some of our officers this war.

On C——re J——N M——E.

He is the emblem of fear,  
 'The foe to his country,  
 'The enemy to courage,  
 'The scorn of the populace,  
 'The scandal of Britain,

The



expressed themselves in open conversation. The complaint seems to have arose from this principle, viz. that it was practicable for the squadron to anchor in Port-Royal bay, between Fort Negro and l'Isle des Ramieres, whereby the French men of war under M. Bompert could not have got out, and the privateers, finding no entrance there for them and their prizes, must have gone either to Port St. Pierre, or to Grenade, either of which were to be blocked up by a single frigate. Now, the question that arises, is not whether there was danger to be apprehended in blocking up Fort-Royal, but whether it was practicable. I do not pretend to determine this point: there are those it more nearly concerns to do it. C——re M——re was an officer of much estimation among the people; if his conduct was faulty, he ought to have defended it; it was a duty he owed himself, his sovereign, and his country: he should consider, that credulity is often the associate of slander; and that, when a man's character is defamed, if he does not disprove the charge, it is generally reckoned an admission of his guilt.

But admitting, Sir, that Martinico cannot be blocked up so effectually as to ensure the safe navigation of our trading ships, is it not a very sufficient reason for at-

The patron of cowards,  
The contempt of good men, and  
The ruin of the navy;  
In short, but words are wanting to say what,  
Say all that's mean, low, base, and he is that.

PHILO VERITATIS.  
PHILO JUSTITIÆ.

tempting



tempting to reduce it? When the enemy's privateers from Martinico *alone*, have taken near a hundred sail of our ships in less than three months, must it not give some idea of the great detriment we shall be liable to hereafter? Must it not cause dissatisfaction among the mercantile part of the nation to find this nuisance not attempted to be removed? And, even supposing it should be found necessary to give up Martinico at a peace (which I hope will not be the case) the nation would still receive no small advantage from the temporary possession of it; as we should thereby effectually obtain the desired security, and reduce our enemy to the necessity of submitting to an equitable accommodation.

I take it for granted, that an addition of Sugar Islands would be an inducement to retain Senegal and Goree. It has been acknowledged, that those places “are of real importance in the slave and gum trades;” but then it is urged, that “our own African settlements have hitherto supplied us with slaves sufficient for our American purposes: and the trade for gum is, perhaps, not of consequence enough to make us amends for the annual mortality, which we already lament, of our brave countrymen, to guard our African conquests \*.” That we have hitherto supplied our own occasions for slaves, is true; but that we have greatly decreased in that branch of trade, and the French have near intirely supplanted us in it within these late years, not only by supplying themselves, but the subjects of Spain likewise, is equally true. Besides, did they not openly encroach on our rights and

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 33.



privileges in Africa, as well as in America, and that in the most important settlements we were possessed of? Did they not endeavour to supplant us at our capital settlement, Anamaboe? Did they not do the same at Whydah, and in the rivers Sierra Leone and Sherbro? Did they not enjoy a great share of the trade of those places? Did they not do the same in the River Gambia; for, not content with cutting off the communication between the settlements of our company, and a branch of the River Senegal, which falls into the Gambia, by erecting a fort at the junction of these rivers, did they not erect another fort at the mouth of the River Gambia, opposite to a fort of our own, and within our undoubted territories? Did they not do this without molestation from us? Did they not even take upon themselves to fire upon our trading vessels, though within such our undoubted rights, and under our very forts? And shall we then again put it in the power of France to repeat those insolences? Shall we thus passively let them go unpunished? Shall we suffer them again to engross the whole gum trade? Shall we suffer them to retain, as of right, an extent of coast of five hundred miles from Cape Blanco to the River Gambia? And, in a word, shall we suffer them to exclude us from the whole African trade; for this will probably be the certain consequence of their repossessing Senegal and Goree? The loss of the slave trade must be very great to this nation, not only because we have entirely lost all share of that trade to the Spanish colonies, but likewise, because it is the only trade we can carry on with the French Sugar Islands with any advantage; for they will pay us in specie for slaves, when they will not for  
any



any other commodity. Not only this, but the gum \* from hence is an essential article in our manufactures, as well as those of France; and the prohibiting the future sale of it to them would be of infinite prejudice to the success of their manufactures. And, can it be said, Sir, that Senegal and Goree are not of consequence enough to make us amends for the loss of a few lives, when it is computed that the possession of them has brought into the French East-India company, a clear annual income of five hundred thousand pounds; and, when the retaining these settlements alone would fully answer our views in the East Indies, without making any demands there. But, as affairs in this quarter of the world have been hitherto passed over in silence, I would beg leave to make a little digression on that head. Our trade there is in the hands of a private company, and is likewise, in some respects, disadvantageous to the nation. The people, therefore, could not but be dissatisfied, at seeing a particular interest preferred to a general one. But, as the climate there makes havock enough among the subjects of this kingdom, without having recourse to the destructive weapons of war, I think we ought, if possible, to prevent our being involved in a war there for the future. Adopt therefore the system of France; let Madras last war, and Fort St. David this war be your precedent. Let Kari-cal, Pondicherry, and Port Dauphin at Madagascar, be effectually demolished: even prevent them from be-

\* The value of this branch of trade alone, may be the more easily conceived, when it is considered, that, in the year 1755, the French imported no less than two millions seven hundred thousand pounds of gum; which was sold to us at twelve pounds per hundred.



coming formidable to us hereafter, by filling up their ports with old ships, &c. It would be a work of many years before France could repair these losses, even supposing that we should restore their African settlements; but, if we retain them, the company would, very probably, soon become bankrupt, and the trade of France to the East-Indies intirely annihilated. And to convince you, Sir, of the great utility of the African trade to the French East-India company, only consider the amazing power and extent of trade the French have acquired in the East-Indies within these very few years. It was the famous Colbert that established an East-India company in France: he protected it with his authority, supported it with his money, and, in short, took upon himself the whole burden of it. His endeavours were not useless; he left it in a thriving condition. But some time after his decease, matters took a different turn; it could be no longer made advantageous, no not even equivalent to the charges incurred in carrying it on. Some merchants of St. Maloes took it upon themselves in 1710, upon giving ten per cent. upon the whole profits they made by the sale of their goods; and it long remained in a languishing condition in their hands. But the company, and that trading to Africa, being associated together, they have been made to assist each other, or rather Senegal and Goree have supported both. Before the last war, the French never made any considerable head in the East-Indies; and, we need not doubt, but that they have rose to such a height of power there, merely by these very African settlements. If the profits were not so great from the latter, could the French company maintain a fleet of seven or eight ships  
of



of the line in the East-Indies, to protect their settlements there \* ? And do our company even maintain one ship of the line there ? In a word, on the retention of these pretended worthless African settlements, and our vigilance to prevent any intercourse from France to them, depend the continuance of our sugar trade, and the sure depression of that of France. It is from Africa alone, they have been enabled to become so formidable in the East-Indies, and to monopolize the sugar trade ; it is from Africa alone, they can hope to support their share of that trade in St. Domingo, Grenade, and Equinoctial France.

As the latter has been recommended as a more proper object of our regard than the French Caribbee Islands, it may be necessary to take some notice of that matter. The author may recollect the objections to our possessing not only Senegal and Goree, but likewise Guadalupe, were chiefly founded upon a remonstrance, that the expence of lives, occasioned by the intemperature of the climate, would not allow of it. Therefore his observation, that the Isle of Cayenne, and its appendix Equinoctial France, having but very few inhabitants, and those easily removed, would be an acquisition every way suitable to our situation and desires †, was altogether needless. A great advantage we should reap by the retention of Martinico and Guadalupe, would be the great addition of subjects to this

\* In the two first engagements between M. Dache and Vice-admiral Pococke, there were but two king's ships in the French squadron, and one of them was only a frigate of twenty-six guns.

† Interest of Great Britain, p. 46.



kingdom, as most of the inhabitants would undoubtedly remain there. Nor do I see that Cayenne and Equinoctial France would be the asylum of many of the refugees from “Jamaica, Barbadoes, &c.”. There is not the least temptation to invite this refuge. Being so very near the line, Cayenne is extremely hot and unwholesome, nor is the soil in any wise fertile; for the inhabitants have not only very few commodities of any sort for exportation, but they cannot even produce provisions enough to supply their own wants. The coast of Equinoctial France is very low, and the country being subject to frequent inundations, the natives are often obliged to build their huts in trees to avoid being drowned. Is it to be thought we can make this colony turn to greater account than the French? they have been in possession of the country about one hundred and thirty years, and I cannot say I ever heard of any considerable exports they made from thence. There is no fear to be apprehended of any great increase of French power from this quarter; they are hemmed in by three very jealous powers, the Portuguese of Brazil, the Dutch of Surinam, and in the inland country, by barbarous and uncivilized tribes of Indians, inveterate enemies to all European settlers. And, should the French ever afford us occasion for jealousy there, we might soon reduce them; for, though possessed of an extent of coast of about one hundred and forty miles in length, they have not a single port all the way. The security of Equinoctial France depends on the Isle of Cayenne; the security of that island depends on the fort, and that fort

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 46.

† Ibid.



is very trifling, and ships may anchor close under the fortifications.

I think, Sir, I have already sufficiently proved the necessity of requiring such cessions from the enemy as I have premised, both on the principles of trade, and security of our rights and properties; but as many sententious, or rather quibbling objections have been raised, in order to avoid the imputation of subterfuge and evasion, I would beg leave to animadvert a little on them. The principles of these objections may be reduced to four:

I. That by retaining them, we should show a spirit of ambition.

II. That they will be but of little benefit to us.

III. That they are to “be looked upon as given back to France for a most important consideration, if they can be the means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforeseen distresses,” and

IV. That, if the King of Prussia “should extricate himself from the dangers that surround him” we should “employ them to recover out of the hands of France those towns of Flanders, gained for the Austrian family, by the valour, and at the expence of England, and which have been so perfidiously sacrificed †.”

In support of the first objection, we are told by the Remarker, that “the views which every state ought to have at the making of peace may be reduced into two: 1. To attain those objects for which she went

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 41.

† Ibid. p. 42.



“ to war ; and, 2. To receive some seasonable indemnification for the charges she has incurred in carrying it on.” And we are farther given to understand, that without openly avowing some views of ambition, no nation can possibly claim more.”

With regard to these political axioms, considered indifferently, they are very problematical ; but, considered as relative to each other, certainly very contradictory. The first had better have been omitted, it can't be made a fixed general rule ; for, upon that principle, every state that goes to war with the view of extending its territories, at the expence of its neighbours, or even of reducing them to her subjection, has the liberty, nay, *ought* to attain them, as being the *object* for which she went to war. The other is a direct contradiction to it. I believe the Remarker would not reject my admission of resting the whole upon his second axiom, by inserting the words equivalent and security ; for, when a state goes to war in defence of her right or property, no security can be reasonable unless equivalent, that is, unless it fully secures that property ; nor can any indemnification be reasonable, unless full satisfaction is made for the charges incurred in carrying it on. The Remarker asks, that “ if France, influenced by a dread  
“ of exertion of the British power, had given up Nova  
“ Scotia, with its ancient and true boundaries, had demolished their fort in the province of New York,  
“ had removed themselves from the Ohio, and renounced  
“ all claim to that territory ; and that, on these concessions, the ministry had then ceased from hostilities,  
“ without requiring, or even claiming Canada, whether  
“ we



“ we should have had a treacherous and delusive peace.”

No doubt, these were terms, that so far from meeting with a refusal, would have been greedily accepted ; but let me add, that they were terms we had a right to demand, upon a double consideration ; first, as being stipulated in former treaties ; and, secondly, as rightfully belonging to us. But wherefore can these restitutions by France (for they can be called by no other name) be the *ne plus ultra* of our demands ? Does not the different state of affairs at present require a different consideration than they did at the beginning of the war ? After having been obliged to enter into a tedious, bloody, and expensive war, to recover those rights, must it not be both reasonable and just to require a full indemnification, as well as a full security, for the charges incurred in supporting those rights ; and likewise the charges occasioned by the unnatural extent of such war, even without reflecting on the perfidy and ambition of France, the rivalry between us for superiority, and the necessity of curbing their power to give us that superiority.

As the Remarker's moderation was modern doctrine, I could wish, and, I think, it ought to have been, ushered in with the usual formalities, either of custom to authorize, or some notable reasons to prove, the necessity of a change, and the use of it for the future. As this has not been done, I am apprehensive that the Remarker could not invent matter sufficient to support his argument, and therefore it must fall to the ground. Among the ancients, it was the custom for the victors to proportion their demands according to their successes :

P

bare



bare security and indemnification were not then the ne-  
 plus ultra of moderation ; they were terms held in little  
 or no estimation, and that even among the religious  
 Jews, and the wise and equitable republican states of  
 Greece and Rome. Nor, in fact, can I comprehend  
 the meaning of the proposed indemnification, regarding  
 only the charges incurred in carrying on a war, be-  
 gan on the principle of self-preservation, it must be very  
 unreasonable, and is therefore applicable to the present  
 war between us and France. Can France indemnify  
 us for the loss of the many thousand fellow-subjects we  
 lament ? Can France indemnify us for the ravages and  
 massacres perpetrated by her in North America ? Ought  
 not these to bear some weight in respect to indemnifica-  
 tion ? Ought not France to indemnify the Hanoverians  
 and Hessians for the ravages committed in their country ?  
 Ought she not to indemnify them for the contributions  
 raised upon them, and the confiscations of their revenue ?  
 And to shew you, Sir, how we may extend the spirit of  
 this same word *indemnification*, which the Remarker so  
 much harps upon, we need only recollect the treaty of  
 1701, between Lewis the Fourteenth and his grandson  
 the Duke of Anjou, whereby Flanders and the Mila-  
 nese were expressly ceded to the French king, as an in-  
 demnification for the charges incurred by him in ad-  
 vancing the Duke of Anjou to the throne of Spain.  
 Whence then proceeds the necessity of this great change  
 in the maxims of war ? and whence this spirit of res-  
 titution ? Are kings less ambitious ? Are they more ob-  
 servant of the obligatory ties of good neighbourhood,  
 and their own most solemn engagements ? No: the de-  
 vastation



vastation of whole provinces, the demolition of cities,  
 and the massacre of mankind, are made subordinate to  
 the caprice of majesty; the groundwork of the most  
 solemn treaties is interest and convenience, and they  
 are kept no longer than they answer the base purposes of  
 making them. However, as I was willing to convict  
 myself of any error in this respect, I have made it my  
 business to consult Machiavel, Grotius, and Puffen-  
 dorf, authors who have much distinguished themselves  
 on the matters of policy and war. I shall not give any  
 quotations from them in opposition to the Remarkers  
 opinion; as it is upon a French principle, I shall  
 content myself with setting forth what two very noted  
 French authors have said upon this subject. The cele-  
 brated author of l'Esprit des Loix, speaking of the right  
 of war, has these words: "The life of government,"  
 says he, is like that of man; the latter has a right to  
 "kill in case of natural defence; the former have a  
 "right to wage war for their own preservation. — In  
 "the case of natural defence, I have a right to kill,  
 "because my life is, in respect to me, what the life of  
 "my antagonist is to him: in the same manner, a state  
 "that wages war, is like that of any other being \*."

This is all Montesquieu says of the matter; and,  
 from hence it is evident, that he considers the right of  
 war as *absolute*, and unlimited, without any reservation  
 of the reasonableness of a mere indemnification.

The ingenious M. Vattel treats much more largely  
 and explicitly on this point. Telling us of the right a state  
 has to secure itself, and to make demands upon the prin-

\* Vol. I. book x. ch. 4. p. 193.



ciples of security, he says, “ It is safest to prevent the  
 “ evil, when it can be done. A nation has a right to  
 “ resist an injurious attempt, and to make use of force,  
 “ and every honest means against the power that is ac-  
 “ tually engaged in opposition to it, and even to anti-  
 “ cipate its machinations, always observing, not to at-  
 “ tack it upon vague and uncertain suspicions, in order  
 “ to avoid exposing itself to become an unjust aggress-  
 “ for.

“ When the evil is done, the same right of security  
 “ authorizes the offended to endeavour to obtain a  
 “ *complete* reparation, and, if necessary, to employ  
 “ force for that purpose.

“ In short, the offended has a right to provide for  
 “ his security for the future, and to punish the offen-  
 “ der, by inflicting upon him a pain capable of deterring  
 “ him afterwards from the like attempts, and of inti-  
 “ midating those who shall be tempted to imitate him:  
 “ he may even, if necessary, put the aggressor out of  
 “ the condition to injure him. He makes use of his  
 “ right in all these measures, when guided by reason;  
 “ and, if any evil results from it to him who lays him  
 “ under the necessity of acting thus, he can accuse none  
 “ but his own injustice.

“ If then there is any where a nation of a restless and  
 “ mischievous disposition, always ready to injure others,  
 “ to traverse their designs, and to raise domestic trou-  
 “ bles, it is not to be doubted, that all have a right to  
 “ join, in order to repress, chastise, and put it ever  
 “ after out of its power to injure them. Such should  
 “ be the just fruits of the policy which Machiavel  
 “ praises



“ praises in Cæsar Borgia. The conduct followed by  
 “ Philip the Second, king of Spain, was adapted to,  
 “ unite all Europe against him ; and it was from just  
 “ reasons, that Henry the Great formed the design of  
 “ humbling a power, formidable by its forces, and per-  
 “ nicious by its maxims \*.”

If I have recourse to precedents from modern history, can I find the spirit of restitution, or even moderation a prevailing system, or ever adopted by any power ? The treaty of Osnabrug in 1648, between Sweden and the Emperor, is a pattern of the present maxims of war, used in respect both to the rights of war and indemnification. By this treaty a cession was made to victorious Sweden of all the Hither Pomerania, the Isle of Rugen, Stetin, and some other places in the Farther Pomerania, the mouths of the Oder, Wismar, the Archbishoprick of Bremen, and the Bishoprick of Verden. And what, Sir, was the indemnification made the Elector of Brandebourg, to whom part of Pomerania belonged ? Had he not the archbishoprick of Halberstadt, the Principality of Minden, the county of Hohenstein, and the Archbishoprick of Magdebourg, an indemnification of much greater value and extent than the country taken from him ? How came Prussia repossessed of the greatest part of Pomerania ? How came Bremen and Verden in the hands of the Danes, and now of his present majesty ? In short, was I to enumerate every treaty of this kind, it would appear there was no state in the empire, nor no kingdom in Europe, but what has changed its master, or had part of



its ancient territories taken from it, or others added to it. But the behaviour of France in Europe on this head, within about this century past, without reflecting on her conduct in America and the Indies, is a sufficient authority for us to begin to adopt this usage ourselves. Has she not got Alsace and Lorraine on the side of Germany; of Artois, the Cambresis, part of Flanders, Hainault, and Luxemburg on the side of the Netherlands; and Roussillon, formerly a part of Catalonia, on the side of Spain? But, because we have not hitherto taken example from France in this respect, or rather because we have so egregiously neglected our own interests hitherto, is it a reason that we should not for the future; when a deviation from this conduct is actually the only way to relieve us from that burthensome debt which the nation groans under, and is the only method to insure us internal peace and tranquillity?

Having already explained myself with regard to the point of security, I shall now consider how far the objects I have before recommended, are consistent with a reasonable indemnification, according to the Remarker's plan: I am perswaded they will not even exceed the bounds of that construction, without having any weight on the principles of security, and the usage of other powers. I shall therefore beg leave to recapitulate something of those objects, in order to form an idea of their extent.

I believe, Sir, it will be acknowledged, that, with regard to Louisiana, the French have not the least pretence to it as of right: their settlement was an usurpation on the just claims of the Spaniards of Mexico, and  
the



the English subjects of Carolina and Virginia ; for, tho' not actually inhabited, it was included in the grants to their respective colonies, and always considered as their property. The French claim of actual pre-occupancy, might as well extend to different parts in South America and the East-Indies, where many large tracts, not possessed by the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Dutch, are looked upon as belonging to them : nor, in fact, is a want of actual possession in the forming foreign colonies, ever considered as an impeachment of the claim. The retention of that country cannot be considered as given up to us by way of indemnification : by retaining it, we only remove them from their encroachments, and require the quiet possession of our own, which we have found by experience it would be dangerous for them to keep any longer.

I believe, Sir, it will be likewise acknowledged, that France, does not claim any title to Cape Breton, St. John, &c. as appertaining to Canada, or because they are settled there : they rather do it by a solemn permission from us. Therefore, I apprehend, the cession of Canada would not give us the sole property in those islands, and the fishery, unless particularly specified in an article of a future treaty ; and, if Canada is restored, would not such a demand seem much more reasonable, and be more easily complied with ? But, in this case, I think, Sir, we have an undoubted right, and very sufficient reasons to exclude France from these islands and the fishery. Before the treaty of Utrecht, the French never settled Cape Breton, which was always considered as belonging to us ; but, being by that  
treaty



treaty obliged to cede Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; which they had endeavoured to conquer, and thereby monopolize the fishery to themselves; they were suffered to possess Cape Breton, St. John, &c. merely for conveniency of carrying on a share in the fishery. But it was with the utmost difficulty the then ministry gave France even that liberty. In the preliminaries delivered to M. Mesnager, it was particularly insisted on, that France should not resort to it upon any pretence *whatsoever*; but, as France made great protestations of her good faith, and honest intentions, the severity of that article was thereupon mitigated. However, in order to keep her from every pretence for encroachments on Newfoundland and the coast of Nova Scotia, she had liberty given her to settle Cape Breton and the other smaller islands; and this was the rather done, as those islands were reputedly so barren and woody, that they were not thought worth settling by us.

With respect to the fishery, France originally paid a duty of five per cent. to England for the bare liberty of resorting to it, a certain acknowledgment of our having an exclusive right to that branch of trade: their right therefore, as well to Cape Breton and the other smaller islands in the mouth of the River St. Laurence, as to the fishery, can arise only from permission, or, at most, a mere conditional grant. If then the intent of these privileges, or grants, which ever you please to term them, have been converted to different purposes, and made to act principally against ourselves, so as to render even our independence, as a nation, very precarious; must it not be both reasonable and just to reassume the sole property? Can it be considered in any other light than



than the revocation of privileges, which have become forfeited from the very nature and intent of their grant?

By restoring Canada, we should therefore have a most evident balance in our favour on the side of North America, and a greater right to insist on an indemnification from another quarter: and this, Sir, I have referred to the French Sugar Islands and African settlements, as being such as would prove of the greatest detriment to the French, and the greatest benefit to us. Much has been said by the Remarker upon the sufficiency of the single island of Guadalupe in this respect, but I think with very little reason and propriety. We are told by that gentleman, that “without estimating the land, the houses, the works, and the goods in the island, the slaves, at the lowest valuation, are worth upwards of one million, two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling.” But what is all this to the purpose? Had the Remarker seen the articles of capitulation to the inhabitants of that island, his memory must have been very defective, or himself guilty of great partiality: if he had not seen these articles, he ought to have done it, before he took upon himself to talk so roundly. He will excuse my freedom, when he finds, that if Guadalupe is ceded to us at a peace, this very “land, the houses, works, and goods” are subject to be sold as private property to their fullest value; for, not only all English subjects are absolutely excluded, from having a possession in the island during the war, but it is particularly expressed in the 11th article of the capitulation, that “if at the peace the island should be ceded

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“ to



“ to the King of Great Britain, then such of the inha-  
 “ bitants, as do not chuse to live under the English  
 “ government, shall be permitted to sell their posses-  
 “ sions, moveable and immoveable, and retire where-  
 “ ever they please, for which purpose a reasonable time  
 “ shall be allowed ;” only with this reservation, of dis-  
 posing of them “ to none but English subjects.” From  
 hence it is evident, that before any subject of England  
 gets a possession, or settlement in that island, even sup-  
 posing it should be ceded to us at a future peace, he  
 must pay an ample and full consideration for it to the  
 French owner ; and, as most of our own sugar settle-  
 ments are worn out with culture, and those of Guada-  
 lupe are reputedly so fertile, we need not doubt, but  
 those inhabitants who chuse to remove, will do it with  
 as much advantage to themselves as they can. As mat-  
 ters stand upon this bottom, I do not see the least pre-  
 tence for estimating the value, or taking the least ac-  
 count of the “ land, houses, works,” or “ goods.”  
 They are vested in their former owners, and are to re-  
 main so, unless alienated by a legal purchase ; and the  
 English must pay the usual price for the commodities im-  
 ported from thence into England, in common with  
 those of our own islands. Was the sole property of the  
 “ land, houses, works, and goods” in the island,  
 vested in the crown of France, and the inhabitants, up-  
 on a cession to England, liable to be sent off the island  
 without any satisfaction for their possessions, and the  
 money, raised upon the sale of such possessions, was to  
 be applied in discharge of any national debt, or incum-  
 brance, then I grant the argument would hold ; but at  
 present



present it is intirely out of the question : private property in Guadalupe cannot be of any emolument to the public in England ; the only advantage to be received from it, by way of indemnification, will be merely from the encrease of the revenue, and the clear gains of the British merchant : and, in this light, I will venture to affirm, it will not indemnify us for the grants of one single year, much less of the whole war.

But I cannot help observing here, that the Remarker was so warm for a moderation, and so chagrined at what he considered as an affront offered to France, that he was not only apt to forget himself in many other respects than this, but also seemed to have an inclination to affront England. The demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk by France, “ as a preliminary proof of “ her sincerity in ” an “ ensuing negociation \*, ” could not be an “ idea ” so “ altogether extravagant,” nor so “ little justified by precedent or reason ” as the Remarker seemed to imagine : if it had, there was still an effectual alternative proposed by the means of “ hostages.” But the great ambition and treachery of France is certainly a sufficient “ *reason* ” for insisting on this method of humiliation, and showing them, that they must pay a better regard to treaties for the future. Had we not already seen two treaties basely violated ? and had we the *least* reason to suppose, that France would be more punctual in the performance of her future engagements than she had been heretofore ? Nor, indeed, can I in the least conceive, how the execution of a former stipulation can be deemed an affront to any nation. But, if the demolition of Dunkirk, pre-

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 24.



vious to a negociation, had not been a forfeiture due to a former stipulation entered into by France, we were still justified in making such a demand by *precedent*; nor could such a demand without this “*precedent*” have come under the least denomination of an affront, comparatively with what France has received heretofore. The Remarker must know what insolence was used by two Dutch deputies to ministers from France, in a station wherein every power pay them respect as representatives of majesty. If the latter barely mentioned the impossibility of complying with a particular demand, they were told with an air, and in a tone of authority and contempt, that there were but two methods to bring obstinate people to terms, persuasion or constraint; and that, if the former would not influence the French king to a compliance, they should only oblige him to it by the latter: and this was behaviour and language, at a time, when the French king “even consented to execute before the peace was signed, the most rigorous articles of a plan drawn up by his enemies; for instance, those of delivering into their hands such a number of strong towns, which they were to possess in full property; of entrusting them with some more as pledges, and a security of performing his word; of demolishing others under the notion of their giving umbrage and apprehension to those very enemies, who pretended to prescribe the law, and dictated the terms of a treaty; which” French king himself had reason to believe, “they had no intention to conclude\*.” Can any thing be more expressive of the submission of France to the authority of

\* Torcy's Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 41, 42.

their



their conquerors, who demanded the execution of *many* articles as *preliminaries*; the most *inconsiderable* of which was much more *considerable* than this demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk? But the above terms were not the only “preliminaries of peace,” nor the only mortification to French pride. To humble France, and lay a greater check on her future growth of power, the deputies insisted on the reservation of making *ulterior* demands, and that France should submit to those demands, even after the signing of the *preliminaries*, and a cessation of arms, nay, it was even deemed insolent in the French ministers to request an explanation of the nature and extent of those demands: “it was sufficient “that it was injurious to France, and diminished the “king’s power †.” In short, Sir, were not every one of these articles offered on the part of France, so many “preliminaries to the preliminaries of peace:” for they were not to be the definitive terms of the peace, but merely “as pledges, and a security of submitting to “others?” It is true, the States had no small reason for their inveteracy against France: they had experienced her oppressive designs and haughtiness in the preceding wars of 1672 and 1688, when they had used their utmost to prevent a rupture. It would be too tedious to recollect the *moderate* views of France, with regard to the former of these wars, wherein the French monarch acted with all the marks of arrogance and tyranny, against a people who had just made themselves distinguished in the eyes of all Europe, by a glorious struggle for religion and liberty against the arbitrary power of Spain for eighty years together. There-

† Ibid. p. 62,

fore,



fore, Sir, the States, in making the usage of France the model of her own, was but acting upon the principle of retaliation; a principle, Sir, established by the law of Nature, and the law of nations; a principle that can never be deemed an infringement of justice and moderation, nor will ever come under the denomination of tyranny or ambition, when made use of to curb an overgrown power; and a principle, Sir, that singly and alone would give us sufficient "*reason*", and sufficient *right* to inflict the most severe forms to humble French pride, and debilitate French power. Have they not carried on their malicious designs against us to greater excess than ever they did against the States? Have they not hired assassins to kill our kings, and caused frequent tumults and rebellions in the heart of our country? Have they not carried devastation into our most fertile colonies? and, in short, what have they not perpetrated in their efforts to reduce us to a state of beggary and servitude? Have they not likewise encouraged pretenders to the throne of this kingdom, contrary to their most solemn engagements? Do they not even still support such pretenders, and actually supply them with money, with a view to make them tools subservient to their future schemes? If we have hitherto evaded their snares, if they have not been able to make such an impression on us, as they did on the Dutch in the war of 1672, who are we to thank; not their good intentions and efforts, but the kind influence of Heaven, which inspired us with that precaution, and enabled us to make that resistance which have hitherto put it in our power to avoid the impending wreck, and which now lays before us the glorious



fious opportunity of effectually preventing it hereafter?

Not, Sir, that I would from hence infer, that this demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk previous to a negociation, or even posterior to a pacification, is an object *so very important* as some have been induced to believe: my sole intention is to shew, that it would not be *so very unreasonable*.

I admit the circumstances of this war are something different from that wherein the Dutch made such demands on France; but then this difference is not *so superlatively great*, nor our superiority *so excessively little*, as to require such a vast change and diminution. It is true, France was then opposed by a confederacy of powers, but such a confederacy that was latterly greatly divided; each associate being, in the terms to France, for making every thing to his own advantage. Not only this, but the great damage done to our trade by the enemies privateers, the dissensions in England, the miscarriage of the expedition to Canada under Brigadier Hill, the apprehensions of the defect of Portugal, Savoy, and some of the contingents of the empire, the former of which power had then lately sustained an immense loss by an attack made by a French squadron at St. Salvador, the capital of the Brazils; and particularly, the *vast* expences of a *war*, which the parliament had declared *impracticable*, and the death of the emperor Joseph, without any other heir than Prince Charles, whereby the chief object of the war, the prevention of an union of the French and Spanish monarchies, was likely to become equally dangerous by a union of the  
Spanish



Spanish monarchy with that of Germany; in a manner rendered a peace absolutely necessary.

Let us now cast an eye on the present war. Here, indeed, we see France at the head of a confederacy, but such a one, as is without money, and, I had almost said, without men; and a confederacy, that has already exerted their utmost efforts to very little effect. And there are two very substantial reasons why France cannot extend the war, as she did then, as lately suggested. 1st, It is not so consistent with her true interest, by reason of the largeness of her foreign colonies, and the extent of her trade from thence to an European market: for, if France cannot keep up her correspondence with foreign countries, nor transport her commodities to her correspondents or factors there, such correspondents must desert their factories, or be obliged to have recourse to other powers that can supply them. Holland, nay, England might not profit a little from this their difficulty. By the protection given by our fleets to the navigation of the merchant ships, they would, no doubt, use their utmost endeavours to supplant the French, and introduce our own manufactures. 2dly, The allies of France being most of them mercenaries, and the others unable to support the necessary expences of the war themselves, the whole burden falls on France. Will the Russians, will the Swedes, will the Saxons, will the Wirtemburghers act without the payment of their subsidies? Will the Ottoman court look with unconcern upon the motions of Russia and Austria, if France suspends her largesses, when such large offers may be made on the part of Great Britain and Prussia? Must not therefore  
the



the necessary remittances to preserve a superior interest among those powers, occasion a much greater demand for money in France, than at a time when she fought upon her own bottom, and was, latterly, much assisted by the measures of Spain? The extent of the French trade to their foreign colonies, and among the several powers of Europe, must likewise have produced a considerable amount to the French revenue, without being felt among the inhabitants: of course the loss of that addition to the revenue, by the obstruction of their commerce, must render other taxes more necessary and more burthensome. We may therefore assure ourselves, that if France is inclined to hearken to peace, when at the head of such an alliance, it is from her incapacity to continue the war. Great quantities of plate have been already melted into specie in that kingdom: let the war go on a little longer, and the next thing we shall hear done, will probably be the raising the dixmes of the estates. In short, Sir, we had better carry on the war with vigour a year or two longer, than have another at the end of eight or ten years, which will be the certain consequence, if we do not effectually distress France now we have it in our power. Let us not discard the glorious opportunity of giving a lasting peace to ourselves and all Europe, when it so readily offers; an “opportunity,” Sir, perhaps the only one, we shall ever have of putting “it out of the power of France to violate its faith for “the future\*.”

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 31.



The reasonable retention of these French possessions, and the expediency of continuing the war, being premised, let us now consider the second objection as to their sufficiency, for us.

I have already explained myself upon our views in North-America, the next that comes under my consideration, is the objection made to retaining the French Sugar Islands. With regard to our possession of Guadelupe, we have been told, “ That a country fully inhabited by any nation, is no proper possession for another of different manners, language, and religion \*.” Now, I should be glad to know from the author, why this objection is not equally cogent against Canada, where the inhabitants are so remarkably addicted to bigotry and superstition, and where, under an English government, they are liable to be reduced to the utmost insignificancy and poverty? Speaking of the population of Canada but a few lines before, the same author says, “ many” (of the inhabitants) “ will chuse to remove, if they can be allowed to sell their lands, improvements, and effects” (which they are since authorized to do by the capitulation;) and that “ the rest will in less than half a century from the crowds of English settling round and among them, be blended and incorporated with our people both in language and manners.” This supposition, I think, Sir, ought to have an equal influence in favour of Guadelupe, where every thing is infinitely more favourable to indulge such an expectation. But the candid gentle-

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 46.



man is here guilty of great partiality : he does not in the least controvert, or express a doubt of the assertion of the Remarker, that “ the hand of government ” was “ heavy on the Protestants of France : ” that “ many “ of these people ” were “ already established in this “ island, and ” had “ connections of every kind with “ those of their own at home ; and ” that might “ we “ not hope and expect that this ” might “ be an inducement to many others to make this their retreat, “ and that the colony ” might “ be enriched by them, ” he omits taking any notice of these matters, as if they had never been mentioned. But there is something farther, I would beg leave to address to that gentleman and his brother advocates on the same score. Let them enquire how many there are of English and Dutch extraction, settled in the French Sugar Islands, particularly with regard to the latter ; because, I have heard, that the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil by the Portuguese in 1640, contributed, in no small measure, to their establishment. These are not the only reasons why we may expect the present inhabitants of Martinico and Guadalupe, if those islands should be ceded to us, to remain there ; there is another argument still more strong and tempting. Brandy being the produce of France, the distilling the melasses of sugar was strongly prohibited by the French government, whereby the inhabitants of their islands sustained a great loss, for the article of rum alone, made from the melasses, has been acknowledged to defray the charges of cultivating and producing the sugar ; and, had not the French governors by virtue of a dispensatory power they have in



their commissions, suffered the inhabitants to procure a vent for their melasses among our people of North America, they could never have undersold us in the sugar trade, as they have done between thirty and forty per cent. cheaper. A trade so prejudicial to our own sugar planters, caused great clamours from them; the legislature interfered, but that only tended to convince us, that “men will be tempted to smuggle whenever  
 “ the profit surpasses the risk; and that risk consists less  
 “ in the punishment, than in the means of eluding all  
 “ perquisitions.” Do not our colonies, even now, in the time of open war, carry on a very extensive trade with the French islands in ships under the denomination of flags of truce? By such intercourse as this, the French have been familiarized to us, and the great gains they will receive by this large and uncontrouled branch of trade, will be so great, that, as I have said before, that consideration would be sufficient of itself to reconcile the most zealous enthusiasts to our government. But then we are told, that it will be impossible to prevent a trade with France, and that even “supposing we can effectually” do this, “one hundred thousand pounds  
 “ will supply them with British manufactures; and  
 “ that the other two hundred thousand pounds will be  
 “ spent in France in the education of their children,  
 “ and support of themselves, or else to be laid up there,  
 “ where they will always think their home to be\*.” This, Sir, seems to be the principal objection urged against retaining Guadalupe, and, I own, would have

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 47.



great weight with me, if I conceived it to be as represented ; but, as I do not coincide with the gentleman upon the construction of the article of the capitulation to the inhabitants, upon which he founds this argument, I will presently give him my reasons why I differ from him in this point. The 13th article of the capitulation runs thus, “ The inhabitants shall have liberty to send their children to be educated in France, and to send for them back, and to make remittance to them whilst there.” Now it is certain, the full sense of the article is very vague and indeterminate, but we are not from thence to infer the propriety of every impertinent suggestion. General words are defective of themselves, if we credit the law of reason, nay, common sense, which tells us, *Generale nihil certi implicat*. If this maxim is ever regarded, it ought to be more particularly so in the present case. True, there is an implied infinity ; but infinity in a matter, that must, from the nature of things, be temporary and variable, is very absurd.— An argument alone sufficient to overturn the gentleman’s opinion : but not to insist merely on that, let us consider the circumstances of the case. Had the inhabitants entertained the least expectations (though ever so distant) of enjoying such an extraordinary privilege under an English government ; had they in the least suspected that they could make such a demand consistent with the authority of our commanding officers, would they not have intimated their inclinations more openly ? If the implication was meant to extend *ad infinitum*, would not the answer have been more particular and explicit ? But, could the

com-



commissions of our officers give them such an unlimited authority ? Could they have a licence given them to settle the jurisdiction and civil polity of that island *ad infinitum* ? No Sir, they certainly could not ; their commissions could not extend so far : they could make no change in the system of government ; they could not grant any immunity or indulgence, that was not *limited* either by *time*, or *condition*. Thus we see all the articles that have a tendency this way, are granted with a reservation, or actually referred to the pleasure of his majesty. Had such a privilege been even suspected to extend so far, and was so readily granted, need we doubt that the modest Marquis de Vaudreuil would have held his silence on that head, when he had such an excellent example ? I am convinced therefore, that this privilege was intended to extend no farther than the continuance of this war : and even if it had, we may reasonably compute, that not one half of the inhabitants would send their children to be educated in France, in a religion so different from their own, and in a country whence their forefathers had been expelled by a religious persecution.

I admit, that the possession of Guadalupe alone will stop the privateering business but little \* ” ; the French, being still in possession of the large, strong, and convenient island Martinico, would have it in their power to annoy us as much as ever : an assertion we have already experienced the truth of. But then, I do not think, that “ our obtaining possession of all the Caribbees,

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 46.

would



“ would be more than a temporary benefit \*: ” it is a  
 very ridiculous argument, and the reason given for it  
 much the same, viz. “ because it would necessarily soon  
 “ fill the French part of Hispaniola with French inha-  
 “ bitants, and thereby make it five times more valuable  
 “ in time of peace, and little less than impregnable  
 “ in time of war; and would probably end, in a few  
 “ years, in the uniting the whole of that great and fer-  
 “ tile island under a French government; their own  
 “ share of which ” we are told, a few a lines after,  
 “ would, if well cultivated, grow more sugar than is  
 “ now grown in all their West-India islands †.” I  
 will not cast such a reflection on the author’s know-  
 ledge to doubt he finds himself convinced of his error in  
 these points. He must know, Sir, that France, tho’  
 possessed of all the Caribbees, would encrease her  
 strength, as much as possible, in Hispaniola, as it gives  
 her so great a command of the windward passage, and  
 they find their settlements prove so very beneficial to  
 them, both by their private intercourse with the sub-  
 jects of Spain, and the produce of their lands; more  
 especially as the Spanish government is not so well af-  
 fected to them as formerly: he must know, Sir, that the  
 French part of Hispaniola is separated on the land side  
 from that belonging to Spain, by a barrier of mountains,  
 and that they have already possessed themselves of the  
*whole* extent of the coast they lay claim to: he must  
 know, Sir, that the prohibitions of all intercourse be-  
 tween the two settlements are very great, and encrease

\* Interest of Great Britain, p. 46.

† Ibid. p. 49.



every day : he must know what large improvements the French have made, what an additional number of inhabitants they have received within these few years, and that they have already made greater exports of sugar and other commodities annually from thence, than from all their West-India islands put together\*.

That the French “ cannot at present make war  
“ with England, without exposing those advantages  
“ while divided among the numerous islands they now  
“ have, much more than they would, were they pos-  
“ sessed of St. Domingo only †,” though it seems so

\* The following extract of the imports into France from their West-India settlements for the year 1755, (the year before this war) will serve to convince us of the truth of this, and likewise set aright the enormous accounts that have been published of the value of the French Sugar Islands, Guadalupe alone being said to produce annually near fifty thousand hogsheads of sugar.

Exports from St. Domingo for the year 1755.

106,200	hogsheads	of	sugar
22,000	lb.	- -	coffee
184,000	- - -	-	cotton
900,000	- - -	-	indigo
230,000	- - -	-	ginger
182,000	- - -	-	pimento

Ditto, from Martinico, Guadalupe, Grenade, &c,

26,000	hogsheads,	first	sugar
11,200	- - -	-	2d
8,900	- - -	-	3d
16,370	- - -	-	brown
<hr/>			
62,470	in all		
3,600,000	coffee		
573,000	cotton		
82,000	ginger		

† Interest of Great Britain, p. 48, 49.

clear



bleat to the author, is not so with me. Their trade is certainly more extensive; but then, the more ports they have, the greater opportunity they have of escaping our cruizers, and the more so in these seas, where the winds and currents render it so difficult to get up with them. Our own trade likewise must be much more exposed to the enemy. And I am so far convinced of the vast advantages we should receive from a possession of *all* the Caribbees, that I think no stone ought to be left unturned to secure that desirable object: and, in order to facilitate this scheme, it is absolutely requisite, as I have said before, that our right to the Neutral Islands should be fully confirmed at the peace. The possession of Martinico and Guadalupe would otherwise be of very little benefit to us, as the enemy would soon render themselves as formidable as ever from these islands.

If the French power in Hispaniola is at present so much to be dreaded, and there is so much to be apprehended from their future growth, is it not a most cogent reason for restraining them among the Caribbees, since we cannot do it there? And this restraint is the more necessary, as it has been long suspected, that the French have an eye on our invaluable island Jamaica: and their being so remarkably tenacious of their pretensions to the Caribbees, and fortifying themselves there so strongly, tell us, that they have a view, not only of conquering Jamaica, but even entirely excluding us from the sugar trade. Self-preservation therefore, requires that we should exert our utmost to prevent such dangerous designs. And the great advantage of this possession of *all* the Caribbees would be the

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sooner



fooner felt, as we should find ourselves relieved from the great expence and loss of subjects, entailed upon the nation, by keeping such a numerous fleet among those islands. As the French ships, in going to their ports in Hispaniola must necessarily pass some of the Caribbees, a few small cruizers about those islands, assisted by the privateers, would give a pretty good account of them; and those that should escape there, would still run a greater hazard before they got into the ports they were bound to, in Hispaniola, which might be easily blocked up by the fleet, we should be able to keep at Jamaica.

With regard to the third objection, the success of his Prussian majesty renders it unnecessary. The last glorious victory obtained by that monarch seems once more to have established him; his good genius still does, and still may triumph over the malevolence of his enemies; but if, contrary to the general wishes, he should be obliged to submit, can it be reasonable, can it be necessary, to expect, that England should sacrifice her conquests made from France to reinstate him? We have already gone farther than was consistent with prudence, the principles of the war, and even your own promises, Sir; we have paid him an immense annual tribute, or subsidy, no matter which, to enable him, according to the letter of the treaty, to “keep up and augment his forces,” when such augmentation has not been made, and our necessities have been much more pressing and neglected; we have prodigally thrown away the lives of our countrymen in his cause; I say in his cause, Sir, otherwise the convention of Closter-Severn



Severn had never been broke. Let us not then carry extremities still farther; let not a blind partiality precipitate us into greater extravagances: the liberties of Germany, do not, cannot require that we should build the foundation of his establishment upon the ruins of our own. I am the more surprized at this proposal, as coming from him who so much laments the “ vast load  
 “ of taxes and necessities of ” a “ war ” which he owns  
 “ have forced us to an annual expence, unknown to  
 “ former times, and which will almost be incredible to  
 “ posterity.\* ” Ought we not rather to do everything in our power to diminish that “ vast load of taxes ”, and to prevent the melancholy causes of it hereafter? Can the giving up to France her North American encroachments, her Sugar Islands, or African settlements tend to this purpose? Is there not, on the contrary, the greatest reason to apprehend she would, by either of them, quickly recover her former strength, and soon oblige us to support another war equally burthensome and extensive, after we had, by our œconomy, rendered the effects of this less grievous? Nor in fact do I see what foundation there is for such a proposal, nor that it would answer the end. I am persuaded, that upon a depression of the King of Prussia, were we even, in hopes to extricate him, to purchase the intervention and good-offices of France, at ever so dear a price, they would have but little effect. And wherefore should we pay homage to, or seek an alliance with France in a matter which it is her interest to pursue, without either

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 41.



of these unnecessary temptations? for can it be in any degree the true interest of France, either to humble the power of Russia, or aggrandizé that of Austria? The independency of Germany, a consequence of its superiority over France, depends on a union of the several states under one head. If, therefore, a rival is raised in the empire, if the power of that rival is founded on the humiliation, or encroachments on the authority of the other, they will both entertain a mutual jealousy of each other; and opposition will be the reigning principle of their measures; the one to recover its lost rights, and the other to maintain its new acquired power. If the States take different parts in this division, must it not weaken the whole body, and render it more susceptible of a conquest by a powerful invader? It has, therefore, been always thought, and still will be thought good policy by the French, to promote such a division in the empire. Have they not hitherto always encouraged the slightest pretensions of an upstart state to encounter the imperial authority? Do they not now pay subsidies to several of the electors? Do they not keep their troops in pay as auxiliaries, and is it not with a view to employ them against their neighbours, and thereby debilitate the power of the whole? But if France finds that, now she has effectually gained her ends, by seeing two powerful rivals in the empire ever ready to thwart each other, the only way to recover her colonies, is by being for the present a little remiss in working them up to destroy each other effectually, can we be so weak to imagine she will prefer her connections with the house of Austria, which, in fact, are repugnant to her former



mer policy, and prejudicial to her most darling interests, rather than accept of peace from a victorious enemy, and engage in a system, which is even now greatly to her advantage to pursue? And admitting, Sir, that France should for the present engage in this our system, can any one say it will be any hindrance to her making another general confusion hereafter?

But, as I said before, I think the intervention of France to reinstate the king of Prussia would be to no effect? Can we be so weak to suppose, that the empresses of Russia and Austria, and the King of Poland, as Elector of Saxony, would forego the long-wish'd-for opportunity of plucking his feathers? Would they not divide the spoil as avowedly confessed by treaties, notwithstanding the defection and utmost displeasure of France? Besides, has not France, by her accession to these treaties, become a principal in the confederacy? And would not such intervention be a deviation from the cause of the alliance, and the declared motives of entering the empire? But, let us suppose (*argumenti gratiâ*) that we could so far prevail with France as to cause her defection from the confederacy, and give her assistance in conjunction with us to reinstate him, could we receive any relief in the end by it? Could France, after being reduced to so low an ebb by the fatalities of this war, enter into another against three such great powers? Could she make any great impression against them *vi et armis*? Certainly not; our intention, in making an alliance with France, would be therefore lost, and many might be the evils resulting from this system. It was our alliance with France that first raised her to be a naval power; let us not then, in the name of common sense,



sense, when we are bewailing these our former errors, plunge ourselves into others more inexcusable. The treaties between the King of Prussia and us, engage that neither party should make a separate peace; if then, from the necessity of his circumstances he should be obliged to submit to that extremity, who is it that breaks the compact? Are we not at liberty to chuse whether we will be a party to such separate peace or not? The reduction of H——r would certainly be the consequence of that of the King of Prussia: but where can be the least pretence for giving up our conquests to redeem that e——te? The retention of this country by France has been so clearly demonstrated, as being inconsistent with the constitution of the empire, as guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, and even the impossibility of her holding it by reason of its being separated from France by several intermediate states, that I believe there is no farther occasion for enlarging on that head. But, suppose that France should make a conquest of H——r, what hurt would a temporary possession be to the inhabitants of that e——te, or England? If, out of revenge to the perseverance of our measures, France should cause the e——te to be ravaged, might we not retaliate the same usage on their coasts and foreign colonies? Would not the bare apprehensions of such a return be sufficient to overawe France from this extremity? Besides, Sir, our seeming neglect of H——r would show France, that Great Britain will not always forego her national concerns to preserve that e——te in tranquillity; and that, though we can take up arms in defence of the liberties of the empire,

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we can lay them aside, when they interfere with our national honour and welfare ; it will likewise open the eyes of the infatuated Austrians ; it will show them, that, if they fight against themselves and common sense, they are not always to expect Great Britain to take part with them, at the *great* expence of the lives of her subjects, and to purchase a peace for them, at the greater expence of her treasures.

The fourth objection is of the same piece with the foregoing ; and therefore, I think, is already partly answered, if all occasion of starting the subject had not been removed before. On the 28th of November, 1757, Major-general Yorke presented a memorial on this subject to the States-General, whereby it appears, that by the 14th article of the treaty of Utrecht, signed April 11, 1713, “ It is agreed, that no province, fort, town, or city of the Netherlands, or of those which are given up by his Catholic Majesty, shall ever be ceded, transferred, or given, or shall ever devolve to the crown of France, or any prince, or princess of the house or line of France, either by virtue of any gift, exchange, marriage contract, succession by will, or by any other title whatsoever, to the power and authority of the most Christian King, or of any prince or princess of the house or line of France.” — And by the same memorial it is stated, that “ in the barrier treaty, those very stipulations are repeated in the first article. His Imperial and Catholic Majesty promises and engages, that no province, city, town, fortress, or territory of the said country, shall be ceded, transferred, given, or devolve to the crown of  
“ France,



“ France, or to any other but the successor of the  
 “ German dominions of the house of Austria, either by  
 “ donation, sale, exchange, marriage contract, heri-  
 “ tage, or testamentary succession, nor under any other  
 “ pretext whatsoever; so that no province, town, or  
 “ fortress, or territory of the said Netherlands, shall  
 “ ever be subject to any other prince but to the succe-  
 “ sor of the states of the House of Austria alone, except  
 “ what has been yielded by the present treaty to the  
 “ said lords the States-General.”— On the 25th of Ja-  
 nuary following, Count d’Affry the French minister,  
 presented a memorial in answer to these representations,  
 and therein is the following paragraph; “ It is there-  
 “ fore, by express command of the king my master,  
 “ that I declare to your High Mightinesses, that the  
 “ introduction of French garrisons into Ostend and  
 “ Nieuport, had no other motive than what I have just  
 “ mentioned in this memorial, (the Empress Queen’s  
 “ being under an *absolute* necessity of employing *all* her  
 “ forces to defend her hereditary dominions in Ger-  
 “ many.) That his majesty’s troops shall remain there  
 “ *only* to the end of the present war: and that they  
 “ shall even march out sooner, if the empress queen  
 “ shall desire it; and that they shall march out the very  
 “ moment that she shall intrust the guard of those two  
 “ places to her own troops.” Now, what can be more  
 significant and expressive than the terms of these stipu-  
 lations, both on the part of the empress-queen, and the  
 French king; and what more specious and obligatory  
 than the promises contained in d’Affry’s memorial? Can  
 we think that the empress queen would give up the whole  
 com-



Command of Flanders, and the great emolument she receives from their being ports open to trading ships, if she could possibly avoid it? If she had ever made any private contract with France for the sale of those places, would she not be glad to evade the executive part of such contract? Is she not, in her private and public character, said to run all lengths to satisfy her insatiable lust of power and avarice? therefore, if France should retain those places in opposition to her remonstrances, would not England, Holland, and the German states, all join to take them by main force? But, if the empress queen should suffer herself to be prevailed upon to acknowledge them as French property, and we should be inclined, by prostituting our own acquisitions, to redeem them out of the hands of France, what security could the empress queen give, what foundation could *we* have to hope, that she would not play the fool again? If both she and the French king break through such solemn and explicit compacts, will they not break thro' any thing? And what weight could we put in the faith of majesty, and the tenor of treaties, when we have seen them so basely perverted, and so perfidiously violated? Would not our kindness to her be rather an inducement for her to repeat her folly over again? It would, in fact, be putting so much clear money in her pocket, and she might, by the same rule, mortgage them at pleasure; and will it be said, Sir, that we shall not have as much occasion for redeeming them hereafter, as we have at present? I will own, I do not "tremble  
 " at the prospect of seeing Newport and Ostend be-  
 " come French property:" I do not think "a British

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“ administration” need so much precaution, to “ use  
 “ their utmost endeavours to prevent this at the peace\*.”  
 Rather let us admire the pleasing opportunity of mortifying our very good allies the Dutch, as well as the Austrians, and of showing them that we can retain a just idea of their “ ingratitude:” let us now, Sir, for once begin to “ learn to prefer our own interest to that  
 “ of others, and to proportion our expences on the  
 “ continent to the immediate exigencies of our own  
 “ country:” let us demonstrate to all Europe a generous resentment of their injurious treatment of a people, who gave them liberty and power, even that power, which we now would cherish, and which they as unworthily prostitute to sordid avarice and ambition: let us, Sir, for once evince, that we have an adm———n proof against a German cabal, and who will not give room to another count Gallas to tell us, we “ have acquired a *pennyworth* of glory, which the empress  
 “ queen would buy if she had money enough.” If there should be this necessity (which I am at a loss to conceive) of redeeming Ostend and Newport, who is the most interested to do it, England or Holland? Can the possession of Ostend and Newport hurt the former more than Dunkirk has done? And, if they could, might they not be constantly blocked up by a single frigate? And I will venture to hazard an opinion, Sir, that, notwithstanding the mighty things said of Dunkirk, our trade has not suffered in any proportion by the privateers of that port, as by those of St. Maloes, or

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 42.

† Ibid.



Bayonne. The vicinity of Ostend and Newport to the territories of Holland, would enable France to pour in upon the Dutch both by land and sea; if then they must be redeemed, let Mynheer draw his purse-strings; he is the most likely to suffer. I should even be glad to see a treaty made with France, wherein the names of Austria and Holland, and every thing that has relation to them were omitted: such a treaty would be truly British. Let those good allies fish for themselves; it will not be a little serviceable to us; they will learn to prize our friendship the better for the future. And such a treaty would not, in fact, be of any bad consequence to those powers; for, by retaining the French colonies, and keeping a superiority over their navy, we should be ever able to command respect from France, and give the necessary protection to our allies, and the independency of the Germanic constitution.

Thus far, Sir, have I gone in pursuance of my promise; but, before I conclude, there is something more remains, the attempts on Louisiana and Martinico, objects that require your most particular and immediate attention, before we “send some thousands more of our “national troops” and recall our troops in Canada “to “contribute to another victory in G——y \*.” It is full time to put in execution the schemes against those places, if ever intended: it is already the full season to order, to expedite, the proper stores and forces to be ready to act early in the Spring. If dispatch was used,

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 31.



We might probably have such success as would enable the greater part of the forces on those services, to come home time enough to supply the place of others to be sent to this same G——y, if it should be found so very essentially necessary. Guadalupe capitulated the latter end of April, and, it is very probable, neither Louisiana, nor Martinico, would hold out longer than the latter end of May. It is true, our expeditions will take place later; but the French at Guadalupe had then a strong and powerful friend and neighbour at Martinico, and was every hour in expectation of a reinforcement of land forces from thence, and the assistance of the Squadron of M. Bompard. But neither Louisiana, nor Martinico can have such expectations now, they have no neighbour to supply them with stores and forces, and no sufficient fleet from France to protect them. The governors of those places therefore, upon the loss of New Orleans, and Fort-Royal, out of compassion to the inhabitants, would undoubtedly rather surrender, than see fire and sword carried into the very heart of their settlements. But suppose they should hold out longer, and the French should have a mind to try another campaign in G——y, and we to exert our utmost to prevent their designs there, Prince Ferdinand is at present strong enough to employ the whole French forces with an army of upwards of eighty thousand men, most of them as good soldiers as are to be found in all Europe, and such as would afford the French pretty good pastime. However, if it should be thought too weak, I cannot see why we might not, without any hindrance to these expeditions, still spare ten or twelve regiments

of



of infantry, and six or eight of cavalry to reinforce him. We have at present in England and Ireland about forty regiments of infantry and cavalry, besides the foot-guards and independent companies. Twenty regiments will certainly be enough for our home occasions, when we are not under the least apprehensions of an invasion, and have such an established militia in arms. — In reckoning only twenty regiments at home, I would imply, that the remaining eight might be employed against Martinico, whilst those from Canada made the attempt on Louisiana.

With regard to the practicability of these attempts, I believe, Sir, they are scarce to be doubted. The nation is pretty well convinced, that Martinico might have been in our hands at present, if proper measures had been taken. The whole security of that island depends on Fort-Royal, which lays low, in a bottom, surrounded by unfortified eminencies; a footing there would have ensured the reduction of the whole island. But the misfortune was, an officer commanded, who was intirely unfit for the business: — but *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*. I do not reflect on his good intentions, but a man, in his advanced years, is subject to the infirmities of nature; his conceptions become obtuse and languid, and his constitution incapable of the necessary fatigues of his office. An officer, sent to such a climate, and on such a command, ought to have all the advantages of youth, and a lively genius. I have since often thought it happy for the old gentleman, that he died there; for had he came home, there is great reason  
to



to believe his conduct would have required a strict examination, and, perhaps, the *amende honourable*.

With regard to the attempt on Louisiana, might not the troops, under colonel Byrd and major Hamilton, with the assistance of the other provincial troops, act with vigour the ensuing campaign against the Indians, who would, upon hearing such a force was coming against them, very probably submit to any terms; and then, by the assistance of our Indian allies, might not the army march against the French settlements about Kappa; or, if that should not be thought practicable, by reason of the length of the march to it, might they not move to the westward, and retake our long lost fort of Albama? The troops from Canada (which would certainly form an army of five or six thousand men) might, with the assistance of the squadron at Jamaica, in the mean time, make an attack on the French forts in the Gulph of Mexico; and, though ships of burden might meet with difficulty in getting up the Mississippi to New Orleans (which they certainly will, if they do not go before the freshes come down the river;) yet the army might, in a day or two, march up by land, and would, no doubt, soon make a conquest of it, as the fort, tho' formed upon a regular plan, is weak, and built on a bad foundation: and, as frigates of thirty and forty guns can get up the channel, they would, no doubt, greatly contribute to the success of the land attack. Balize, Mobile, and a few other forts might, during this time, be reduced by the large ships, and, in this case, the interior country must submit.

And



And now, Sir, before I entirely take my leave of you, permit me to hope the same steadiness of your mind, and the same vigorous prosecution of the war, which have hitherto gained you such unusual credit from your country. There are some, and not a small number neither, who have made it their business to propagate a notion, that we have no occasion to undertake any more offensive expeditions against them, because, forsooth (as they say) “ we can have already conquered more  
 “ than we hope to retain ; and therefore, that it would  
 “ be putting the nation to an immense expence to no  
 “ manner of purpose.” But how can we be said to do too much detriment to such an enemy as France; an enemy, who still carries on the war with all the virulence of infernal fury, and who we know to be our natural rival? And, I can farther tell these gentlemen, that our present conquests are not to be retained, because of their *extent*, but because they are *unnecessary* to be retained, and would be of *little* value to Great Britain; such as Canada, and their East-India settlements. I own, Sir, such insinuations have chagrined me much. Wherefore are they become so predominant? Can they be in the least conducive to the honour and welfare of Great Britain? By conquering more, do we not serve ourselves most effectually? Have we not thereby an opportunity to consult our true interest, and what places are most worthy our consideration? Shall we not thereby discover their value to France, and convenience to ourselves? Shall we not attack them in the tenderest part, and reduce them to a necessity of submitting to our terms more speedily? France, Sir, is not to be considered



dered in the common class of adversaries, but as the most dangerous rival; a rival, whose great extent of power is much to be feared; a rival, ever vigilant to promote measures that are diametrically inconsistent with our welfare and security; — a rival, whose interests are, in every respect, incompatible with ours, and whose equality of power with that of our own, is both unnatural and impossible. When I consider, Sir, all these circumstances, can I think such excessive moderation arises from a good cause? Can you, Sir, think it made out of friendship to yourself or the public? Let us recollect, Sir, with what ignominy we have treated our negotiators at the treaty of Utrecht, and with what confusion we call to mind the terms of that peace, which, I will not scruple to say, Sir, gained us much larger cessions than are at present recommended by the most zealous and immoderate stickler against France. Gibraltar, Minorca, and Newfoundland, are ever to be esteemed invaluable acquisitions. Besides, Sir, there were several immunities to be granted in favour of our commerce; the sole property of St. Christopher's was given up; and Dunkirk was to be effectually demolished, an article then deemed of more consequence than all the rest, and of which no promise or deposit was reckoned a sufficient pledge for the performance: it was given into our possession before any treaty was concluded on. Had our ministry made larger demands, they would certainly have been complied with. They did not omit them upon a pretence of moderation, but because France had no other object worth their asking. We had very little to apprehend from their sugar colonies, or Canada; the nation



nation was seldom involved in a direct war with the French in the latter, only to humour the Five Nations who at that time over-awed all Canada. They had done us much injury in Newfoundland and St. Christopher's: these were quietly given up to us, without the least difficulty. What more then could we require? And yet, Sir, these were terms granted only to draw us off from a confederacy, which, upon our defection, was still able to have over-run all France; a confederacy, Sir, that, bent upon the total subversion of France, was then carrying on the war against her with the utmost rigour, and for which we had, notwithstanding, procured a most advantageous barrier, *at the good liking* of our gracious queen, from those very enemies which it was treating so unmercifully.

What, Sir, can I think, when I have seen these insinuations prevail; when I have seen England have forty thousand men idle the greatest part of a year, and no expedition undertaken to oppress the common enemy! Does it not seem as if moderation was adopted? If it was deemed so very dangerous to our continental affairs, to send any forces upon a foreign attempt, might they not have been employed on the French coast? While the war lasts, it must be just to exert ourselves to the utmost against our common enemies, and to do them the greatest detriment we can: it is even incumbent on us, in order to put a speedy conclusion to it; especially when we find, that if these enemies submit to a peace, it will be, because they cannot carry on the war any longer. Might not our large useless fleets at the Leeward Islands be employed in destroying the French forts at Grenade and Cayenne? Might we not

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bombard St. Maloes and Havre-de-Grace to more effect than we have done? In short, Sir, might not our men of war be as well shattered in destroying a French fort, as in fruitless cruizes, and playing at bo-peep before French ports? And I cannot think, Sir, but that a ball, from a French cannon or musket, would be much more agreeable to a British tar, than dying a lingering death by the scurvy, in watching the enemy's motions. The glorious 1759 had near frightened the French to a separate peace: the inglorious 1760 seems to have given them fresh courage; they talk of nothing but carrying on the war with vigour, and, in concert with their allies. Has not, Sir, the countermanding the late expedition (which was, indeed, sufficient to have put Paris itself into confusion, and countermanded, no body knows how nor wherefore) rather excited them to a continuance of the war? Have they not been apt to think too favourably of English humanity and moderation, or rather, have they not had reason to think that we have adopted French fickleness, and are tired of victory and success? From whatever cause, Sir, that expedition was countermanded, let me say, it was derogatory to the honour of the nation. After having the troops collected from the most distant quarters of the two kingdoms, a great number of transports kept in pay, and waiting for them; and then after these troops had got to their destined ports, to be embarked only to be disembarked again, must create suspicions not very favourable, either to the plan, or the directors of its execution. The nation, Sir, has made large supplies, they would not lament them, when they see the rectitude of their



their application: but, when they see these supplies profusely lavished away by thousands, and are ignorant of the cause, must they not complain, and think rather censoriously? To say, Sir, the opportunity of succeeding in that plan was lost, is absurd: there were other objects, perhaps of much more importance to this nation, and, I am sure, of much less difficulty, remained unattempted, and which it was the very season to put in execution.

We have indeed heard, that another expedition is adopted: ships have been sheathed, the forces ordered to embark, and what, for a long time, seemed rather intended to amuse the people, and bully France, is, according to appearances, upon the point of execution. Let me hope, Sir, it may not miscarry at the last! Let me hope, Sir, as I have reason to think from the sheathing of the ships, that it is directed against Martinico! If I am wrong in that conjecture, at least permit me to hope it will immediately occur to your consideration. If that island ought to be taken, proper measures ought to be taken immediately to put it in execution. We find our numerous fleets do not hinder the French landing forces and stores of all kinds: the little squadron under M. Macarti, landed upwards of five hundred soldiers at Martinico the latter end of last Summer; and M. Dugue Lambert, with three or four ships more under his command, sailed lately with five hundred of the royal grenadiers, and great quantities of warlike stores. If we would therefore take Martinico, we must be expeditious; the longer the attempt is delayed, the more impracticable we shall find it.

Remem-



Remember, Sir, that this is the nice juncture, the critical moment, when you are to give your country the welcome proofs of the brightness of your genius, and the elevated sentiments of your soul. Great Britain hath unanimously referred itself to the auspicious name and person of P—T : you received the proffered service like a man who thought nobly, and intended to acquit himself most honourably ; and we have hitherto flattered ourselves you have adhered to these principles. Even now the attention of our senators, of all good men, and true Britons, is fixed on you ; on you alone they depend, waiting, with the impatience of people who are over-burdened with a load they want to relieve themselves of, the time when *they* may express their gratitude deservedly ; and when *you*, Sir, may expect it as a small tribute due to such a glorious victory.


Remember, Sir, in whatever capacity you act, and in whatever public station you are employed, that noble sentiment of John de Witt, which he applied to the Dutch ; be it ever uppermost in your *thoughts*, and ever your unerring principle *in deed*. “ Navigation ” (said he) “ the fishery, commerce, and manufactures, are the four pillars of the state, they ought not to be debilitated, or incommoded by any incumbrance whatsoever ; it is they give subsistence to the inhabitants, and bring riches into the country.”

I am, SIR, &c.

An unprejudiced Observer.

F I N I S.











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